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BONFITTO v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INS. CO.:
THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE IN
PENNSYLVANIA
In the recent case of Bonfitto v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.' it was
held that a question adjudicated adversely to plaintiff in a prior trespass action
against certain tortfeasors, which was affirmed on appeal, became the "law of
the case" and was conclusive against plaintiff in a subsequent assumpsit ac-
tion, arising out of the same transaction, against the insurer of one of the
tortfeasors. The purpose here is to review the development of the law of the
case rule in Pennsylvania, compare it to the doctrine of res judicata, and
to suggest some reasons why its application in the principal case may have
been unwarranted.
2
In March 1952, Marco Bonfitto, plaintiff in the noted case, was injured
when his brother, Antonio, while driving his brother Joseph's car, backed
over his foot. Marco brought no action against his brothers based on the
injury until September 1954, when, in answer to his complaint in trespass,
his brothers set up the defense of the two-year statute of limitations 3 rela-
tive to actions for personal injuries. In reply, Marco alleged that a repre-
sentative of defendants' had promised him that he would be compensated for
his injuries and requested Marco to contact him when he had completely re-
covered; therefore, that defendants should be estopped from asserting the bar
of the statute of limitations because plaintiff had relied upon the promise
of their representative. 4 At trial, for the purpose of aiding the court in ruling
upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings, testimony was taken concern-
ing the grounds for the alleged estoppel. 5 Thereafter, in an opinion filed in
January 1956, the court directed that judgment on the pleadings be entered
1. 195 Pa. Super. 546, 172 A.2d 176 (1961) (Flood, J., filed a dissenting opinion
joined by Ervin, J.) (allocatur granted).
2. This note is not concerned with the question of whether the rule of res judicata
would have been applicable in the noted case and it is assumed, arguendo, that it would
have been if properly pleaded.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953).
4. Brief for Appellees, p. 2, Bonfitto v. Bonfitto, 391 Pa. 187, 137 A.2d 277 (1958).
5. Plaintiff testified that Edgar Bell, an adjuster employed by Joseph's insurer,
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, had visited him in May or June, 1952, and
told plaintiff: "Take care of the foot. Come see me when Dr. Johnson discharge you."
Plaintiff also testified that Bell had visited him in October or November, 1952, at which
time Bell said: "Take care of the foot. When Dr. Johnson discharge, you come see
me up at the office. I no come around no more." See Bonfitto v. Bonfitto, 10 Pa. D.&C.2d
598, 599 (1956).
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for the defendants. 6 On appeal by plaintiff, the judgment was affirmed by the
supreme court per curiam on the opinion of the trial judge.
7
In May 1959, Marco brought the present action in assumpsit, based on a
promissory estoppel, against Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and its
adjuster, Edgar Bell. Defendants pleaded the six-year statute of limitations
relative to actions in assumpsit,8 but did not plead the prior adjudication by
way of res judicata. At trial, on an instruction that the basic issue was
whether Bell made the promise, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff.
Defendants then moved for judgment n.o.v. on the grounds that (1) the issue
had been determined in a prior action and (2) that the statute of limitations
had run. The trial court granted the motion on the latter ground but con-
cluded as to the prior adjudication that stare decisis9 and law of the case were
inapposite because the facts were not substantially the same in the second
action. 10 It was also held that res judicata and collateral estoppel" could not
be relied upon because they had not been pleaded in accordance with the
procedural rules.12 Plaintiff appealed, and no mention of the law of the case
rule appeared in either brief. The superior court, however, affirmed the judg-
ment solely on the ground that the "application of the rule of the law of the
case prevents reconsideration of the question of estoppel previously decided
adversely to . . . [appellant's] present contention.'
13
The development of the law of the case rule in Pennsylvania cannot be
fully appreciated without first generally defining the rule of res judicata and
6. After finding that Bell was "doubtless without any knowledge of or authority
from" the defendant tortfeasors, the court held that "defendants never committed them-
selves to pay anything, gave fair warning that they would not call upon plaintiff again
and did not misrepresent the law of the statute of limitations." Id. at 600, 601.
7. Bonfitto v. Bonfitto, supra note 4.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (1953).
9. "Stare decisis simply declares that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached
in one case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different." Burke v. Pittsburgh Limestone Corp.,
375 Pa. 390, 394, 100 A.2d 595, 598 (1953).
10. At the trial of the second case plaintiff testified that Bell had told him "insurance
company pay for the time and the doctor bill" when Bell first visited plaintiff. As to
the conversation on Bell's subsequent visit, plaintiff testified that Bell told him "insur-
ance company pay for the time and the doctor bill, what the policy call [for] and no
more." The plaintiff's testimony was corroborated by two other witnesses. See Brief
for Appellee Bell, pp. 3-4, Bonfitto v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., supra note 1.
11. The trial court treated the rule of res judicata and collateral estoppel as
separate doctrines. Collateral estoppel is treated in this Note as part of the rule of
res judicata.
12. PA. R. Civ. P. 1030 provides that "all affirmative defenses including but not
limited to . . . res judicata . . . shall be pleaded in a responsive pleading under the
heading 'New Matter.'" PA. R. Civ. P. 1032 provides that "a party waives all defenses
and objections which he does not present either by preliminary objection, answer or
reply . .. .
13. Bonfitto v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., supra note 1, at 550-51, 172 A.2d
at 178.
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its effect upon subsequent controversies. The rule of res judicata may be
stated generally as follows:
Where a reasonable opportunity has been afforded to the parties
to litigate a claim before a court which has jurisdiction over the par-
ties and the cause of action, and the court has finally decided the
controversy, the interests of the State and of the parties require that
the validity of the claim and any issue actually litigated in the action
shall not be litigated again by them.'
4
The rule of res judicata has four general effects on subsequent litigation.
It will bar a second suit by the plaintiff on the same cause of action if the
prior judgment was for defendant. 15 If the prior judgment was for plaintiff
in an action for the recovery of money, his original cause of action is merged
into the judgment and extinguished, a claim on the judgment being substi-
tuted therefor.' 6 Under the collateral estoppel effect of the rule, questions of
law or of fact which were actually litigated in the prior suit are binding in a
subsequent suit between the parties on a different cause of action.17 Pennsyl-
vania courts have extended the application of the collateral estoppel effect
to include questions of fact which might have been litigated in the prior action
and, in certain cases, to questions of law which might have been litigated
therein.' 8 Finally, the direct estoppel phase of the rule prescribes that where
a final judgment not on the merits has been rendered for the defendant, those
matters actually litigated and determined in the prior action are binding on a
second action between the parties on the same cause of action.' 9
While the rule of res judicata has been erected to achieve finality where
there has been a final judgment,20 the law of the case rule seems to have
sprung from a desire to impart finality to matters considered and decided in
an appellate proceeding wherein no final judgment had been rendered.
Though not a child of the twentieth century,2 1 the law of the case rule
14. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 1 (1942). This Section was cited with approval
in Burke v. Pittsburgh Limestone 'Corp., supra note 9, with the comment that the
Pennsylvania rule is broader in that it precludes relitigation of every fact which might
have been considered in reaching the former determination.
15. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 48 (1942) and cases collected in RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 48 (Pennsylvania Annotations 1957) [Hereinafter cited as Pa. Anno.].
16. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 47 (1942) and cases collected in Pa. Anno. § 47.
17. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 68 (questions of fact), 70 (questions of law)
(1942). Pennsylvania cases do not readily lend themselves to the distinctions drawn
by the Restatement between questions of fact and of law: See Pa. Anno. § 70.
18. See Pa. Anno., General Principles, pp. 21-22.
19. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 45, comment d, 49 (1942) and cases collected in
Pa. Anno. § 49, comment b.
20. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 41 (1942) (res judicata does not apply where the
judgment is not final) and cases collected in Pa. Anno. § 41.
21. See exhaustive annotation on the subject in 34 L.R.A. 321 (1896) in which
the following Pennsylvania cases were cited as law of the case decisions, all of which
were second appeals in the same case after a prior appeal had resulted in a reversal
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was not fully enunciated by a Pennsylvania court until 1938 when it was de-
clared in Reamer's Estate22 in the following words:
The doctrine of the "law of the case" is that, when an appellate
court has considered and decided a question submitted to it upon ap-
peal, it will not, upon a subsequent appeal on another phase of the
same case, reverse its prior ruling even though convinced that it
was erroneous.
23
Prior to the definitive statement of the rule in Reamer's Estate, and to
some extent since then, the law of the case rule seems to have been confused
by Pennsylvania courts with the various applications of the rule of res judi-
cata. Much of the confusion is traceable to the early case of Marsh v. Pier,
24
wherein it was stated:
But a judgment of a proper court, being the sentence or conclusion
of the law, upon the facts contained within the record, puts an end
to all further litigation on account of the same matter, and becomes
the law of the case, which cannot be changed or altered, even by the
consent of the parties, and is not only binding upon them, but upon
the courts and juries ever afterwards, as long as it shall remain in
force and unreversed.
25
Though it seems quite obvious that Marsh v. Pier involved a simple applica-
tion of the doctrine of res judicata, and equally apparent that the court's use
of the term "law of the case" was meant to denote no rule differing from res
judicata, the above-quoted passage became the basis for a chain of decisions
in which various effects of the rule of res judicata were described as the
"law of the case."
First came Bolton v. Hey26 wherein the court quoted and applied the
supposed "law of the case" rule of Marsh v. Pier, though again the circum-
stances of the case required the application of no rule differing from res
and new trial: Carpenter v. United States Life Ins. Co., 174 Pa. 636, 34 Atl. 211
(1896); Mechanics & Traders Bank v. Seitz Bros., 155 Pa. 191, 26 Atl. 209 (1893);
Ulmer v. Ryan, 137 Pa. 309, 20 At. 705 (1890) ; Collins v. Barnes, 130 Pa. 356, 18 Atl.
645 (1889); Brandon v. Fritz, 94 Pa. 88 (1880).
22. 331 Pa. 117, 200 Atl. 35 (1938).
23. Id. at 122, 200 Atl. at 37. See generally 5B C.J.S. Appeal & Error §§ 1821-
1835 (1958) ; 21 C.J.S. Courts § 195 (1940) ; 9 Standard Pa. Practice ch. 38, §§ 520-524
(1936) ; Am. JUR. Appeal & Error §§ 985-1001 (1936) ; 2 P.L.E. Appeals § 347 (1957)
Pa. Anno. § 41, comment c (1957).
24. 4 Rawle 273 (Pa. 1833) (A final judgment of a New York trial court in a
suit between plaintiff and defendant's predecessor in interest is conclusive in subsequent
action concerning same subject matter).
25. Id. at 289.
26. 168 Pa. 418, 31 At. 1097 (1895) (Supreme court's dismissal on prior appeal
of sci. fa. sur mechanic's lien on ground plaintiff had, by contract as then construed,
waived right to file lien, bars alias sci. fa. on same cause, though in interim supreme
court had applied different construction to similar contracts in other decisions). This
case is cited in Pa. Anno. § 48 (1957) as an example of the res judicata "bar" effect.
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judicata. Then, in Bell v. Allegheny County,27 the court again relied upon
the Marsh v. Pier rule but described it as "language of this court . . . on the
rule of res judicata. ' '28 Raisig v. Graf29 followed, relying on both the Bolton
30
and Marsh3l cases. Devine's Estate,3 2 in the same year, was decided primarily
on the basis of an estoppel in pais, though both Bolton v. Hey and Marsh v.
Pier were alluded to in the opinion of the court below which was affirmed per
curiam by the supreme court.
Next in the series came Pulaski Avenue3 3 wherein Bolton v. Hey was re-
lied upon though again res judicata alone would have been adequate to dis-
pose of the case. 34 Perhaps feeling the necessity for explaining the application
of the purported "law of the case" rule where there had been no appeal from
the prior judgment, the court indulged in the following reasoning: "The order
of the court below . . . was not excepted to or appealed from . . . and is as
binding and conclusive as if an appeal had been taken and the order had been
affirmed by this court. The decision, therefore, is the law of the case."3 5
27. 184 Pa. 296, 39 Atl. 227 (1898) (In prior suit, affirmed on appeal, it was held
that plaintiff was entitled under a special statute fixing salary at $4500 per year in
Allegheny County instead of a general statute fixing salary at $10,000 per year. In
later suit for salary accruing during subsequent months, prior judgment is conclusive
as to issue of which statute applies). This case is cited in Pa. Anno. § 68, comment c
(1957) as an example of collateral estoppel effect.
28. Id. at 306, 39 Atl. at 230.
29. 17 Pa. Super. 509 (1901) (Judgment for defendant in prior assumpsit action,
though failing to include one item, "bars" later action for same item though prior
decision was erroneous. Prior decision had not been appealed). This case is cited in
the Scope Note of the Pa. Anno. as an example of a Pennsylvania case wherein the
principles of res judicata and law of the case have been treated indiscriminately.
30. Bolton v. Hey, supra note 26.
31. Marsh v. Pier, supra note 24.
32. 199 Pa. 250, 48 Atl. 1072 (1901) (One Naglee died in 1836 and in identically-
worded devises left real property to his daughter Williams and other real property to
his daughter Devine. Williams took two cases to the supreme court, in 1856 and 1859,
in which it was held that she took a fee simple in the property devised her. Upon
death of Devine, Williams claimed to share in the proceeds of her estate on the ground
that Devine took only a life interest in the property devised to her. Orphans' court, in
dismissing Williams' exception to their adjudication, held that she was "clearly
estopped" from bringing a contrary assertion to that successfully contended in her
prior suits).
33. 220 Pa. 276, 69 Atl. 749 (1908) (Order of common pleas quashing petition
for appointment of viewers to assess damages for vacation of a street, from which no
appeal was taken, is conclusive in later petition, brought eleven years later, for a rule
to show cause why the former petition should not be reinstated, though the supreme
court in the interim has declared the law in a contrary sense to that upon which the
prior order was based).
34. This ease may be placed in accord with many other cases standing for the
proposition that although a judgment is erroneous, equitable relief will not be granted
to a party thereto on the sole ground that the judgment was the result of a mistake
of law. The case is cited for that proposition in Pa. Anno. § 126(2) (c) I.
35. Pulaski Avenue, supra note 33, at 280, 69 Atl. at 751. The court may also
have intended to emphasize by that statement that a final judgment rendered by a
lower court, from which no appeal has been taken, is no less conclusive than a judgment
affirmed on appeal. See 20 P.L.E. Judgment § 274 (1959).
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In any event, there seems to be little doubt but that the term "law of the case"
was, at this stage, a mere synonym for "res judicata."
The Marsh v. Pier line of decisions continued with Lafferty's Estate36 in
which the opportunity was perhaps presented to distinguish the law of the
case rule from the rule of res judicata. The court, however, relied for their
authority upon the above cases37 in which res judicata had been applied sub
nomine the "law of the case," and one additional decision 8 in which res judi-
cata had been pleaded and applied without mention of the purported "law of
the case" rule then in vogue.
One might well have believed that the confusion in doctrine or termi-
nology in the application of the rules would have been terminated by the more
detailed enunciation of the law of the case rule in Reamer's Estate.39 Certain
distinctions were there drawn between the law of the case rule and res judi-
cata, and the necessity of a prior appellate consideration for the application
of the law of the case rule was made apparent. However, the indiscriminate
use of the terms was continued in Schroeder Estate"° where the court said,
in describing the effect of two prior, unappealed orphans' court decisions, that
"the matter is now res adjudicata . . . and became the law of the case."'41
Finally, to bring the development of Marsh v. Pier42 to full circle, the effect
of the rule of res judicata was again described as the "law of the case" in
Clarendon V.F.W. Home Ass'n Liquor License Case,43 and the oft-quoted
passage from Marsh v. Pier, which had been designated more than a half-
century earlier as "language of the Court . . . on the rule of res judicata,"
44
36. 230 Pa. 496, 79 Atl. 711 (1911) (Prior orphans' court decree, affirmed on
appeal, holding that a power of appointment had been validly exercised, is conclusive
as to that issue on appeal from later decree in same estate under same will).
37. The cases relied upon were Pulaski Avenue, supra note 33; Bell v. Allegheny
County, supra note 27; Bolton v. Hey, supra note 26; and Marsh v. Pier, supra note 24.
38. Allen v. Int'l Text Book Co., 201 Pa. 579, 51 AtI. 323 (1902) (Judgment for
plaintiff in prior suit between same parties for an installment of salary after allegedly
wrongful discharge of plaintiff, is conclusive as to the question of wrongfulness in second
suit for later installments). This case is cited in Pa. Anno. § 68, comment c, I, as an
example of collateral estoppel.
39. Supra note 22.
40. 352 Pa. 170, 42 A.2d 617 (1945) (Construction of will in two prior adjudica-
tions by the orphans' court, from which no appeals had been taken, is "res judicata"
in later audit of trustee's account under "law of the case" rule).
41. Id. at 171, 42 A.2d at 617-18.
42. Supra note 24.
43. 167 Pa. Super. 44, 75 A.2d 171 (1950) (Prior unappealed common pleas
decision, reversing Pa. Liquor Control Bd.'s denial of license to applicant, and holding
that the statutory quota provisions do not apply to clubs, is conclusive as the "law of
the case" in later proceeding on rule to show cause why prior order should not be
reversed, though supreme court in interim has construed statute to the contrary). This
case is cited in Pa. Anno. § 126(2) (c), I, for proposition that equitable relief will
not be granted from a judgment merely because erroneous.
44. Supra note 28.
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was described as "the classic statement of the principle [of the law of the
case] .,145
One can only wonder how the same passage from Marsh v. Pier46 can
be said to enunciate two rules which are supposedly distinguishable. A pos-
sible explanation lies in the fact that the law of the case rule as defined in
Reamer's Estate47 bears little resemblance to the rule applied in the cases
therein cited as "the leading cases in Pennsylvania involving the doctrine of
the law of the case."'48 Four of those cases are directly traceable to the Marsh
v. Pier definition of the supposed "law of the case" rule. Bolton v. Hey49
was not "a subsequent appeal on a later phase of the same case" but an appeal
in a second suit between the same parties on the same cause of action. In
Pulaski Avenue 50 there had been no prior appellate consideration of the
case. 51 The prior decisions discussed in Devine's Estate, 2 though they had
been appealed to the supreme court, were decisions involving different parties
and different causes of action and could in no way be termed prior appeals
in the same case. Lafferty's Estate53 might today be considered a correct ap-
plication of the law of the case doctrine, though the cases there relied upon
would indicate that the rule there invoked was indistinguishable from the
rule of res judicata. Bailey's Estate,54 though not mentioning the law of the
45. Supra note 43, at 48, 75 A.2d at 173.
46. See quotation accompanying note 25 supra.
47. See quotation accompanying note 23 supra.
48. 331 Pa. 117, 124, 200 Atl. 35, 38 (1938). The cases cited as leading cases were
Ottman v. Albert Co., 327 Pa.-49, 192 Atl. 897 (1937); Bailey's Estate, 291 Pa. 421,
140 Atl. 145 (1928) ; Lafferty's Estate, supra note 36; Pulaski Avenue, supra note 33;
Devine's Estate, supra note 32; and Bolton v. Hey, supra note 26.
49. Supra note 26.
50. Supra note 33. Several other purported law of the case decisions reveal that
the rule has been applied where there had been no appeal from the prior adjudication:
Strauss v. W. H. Strauss & Co., 328 Pa. 72, 194 Atl. 905 (1937) (Where mortgagee
gets small deficiency judgment because mortgagor is given substantial credit for value
of realty under Deficiency Judgment Act, mortgagee, having failed to appeal from
former judgment, is precluded, on later filing of claim in bankruptcy proceeding against
mortgagor, by the "law of the case" from collaterally attacking such judgment, though
the Act was declared unconstitutional in the interim) ; Gould's Estate, 270 Pa. 535, 113
AtI. 552 (1921) (Construction of will adopted by auditing judge in a prior adjudica-
tion, to which no exceptions were taken nor appeal filed, becomes the "law of the case"
and is "res judicata" as to subsequent distributions arising from the same fund or parts
of the fund affected by the prior adjudication).
51. One writer has advanced the sensible argument that the use of the term "law
of the case" to describe the binding effect of a trial court ruling not excepted to or
appealed from is based on the conduct of a party in failing to preserve the question
and on the limited reviewing function of the appellate court: Note, 62 HARV. L. REV.
286, n.1 (1948).
52. Supra note 32.
53. Supra note 36.
54. Supra note 50 (Where the supreme court has, in two prior appeals, passed
finally on matters contained in a given -litigation, a bill of review will not lie in the
court below for errors of law appearing in the judgment or decree).
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case rule, was a decision on a subsequent appeal on a later phase of the same
case and as such bears out the defined limits of the rule. In the remaining
case, Ottman v. Albert Co.,55 a judgment for defendant, not on the merits,
intervened between the first and second appeals. As such, it would seem that
the direct estoppel phase of the rule of res judicata would have been ade-
quate to dispose of the issues.
The reader may well inquire at this point as to the real origin of the law
of the case rule as defined in Reamer's Estate. Some assistance in answering
that question may be found in Rex v. Lehigh Valley Transit Co.56 which was
decided in the same year as the Reamer case. The court in the Rex case was
faced with the second appeal in the same case after a prior appeal in the su-
perior court had resulted in a reversal and an award of a new trial. The
court referred to rulings made on the prior appeal as the "law of the case"
and cited as its first of four authorities the California case of Westerfield v.
New York Life Ins. Co.,57 in which it was stated:
The doctrine of the law of the case is this: That where upon an ap-
peal the Supreme Court, in deciding the appeal, states in its opinion
a principle or rule necessary to the decision, that principle or rule be-
comes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its
subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent
appeal . . .5
It appears that from the similarity in the above statement of the law of the
case rule to that in Reamer's Estate, and from the fact that the Rex case was
handed down shortly before the Reamer decision, the Westerfield case's def-
inition of the "law of the case" rule may have exercised some influence in
formulation of the rule in Reamer. But even the Rex case was not free from
confusion between the two rules, for, of the other three cases there cited as
"law of the case" authority, both Swissvale Borough v. Dickson,59 and State
Hospital for Criminal Insane v. Consol. Water Supply Co.,60 stand for the
proposition that the judgments of the superior court are res judicata on an
appeal to the supreme court in a subsequent suit between the same parties
involving the same subject matter. The remaining case relied upon, Thaler
55. Supra note 48 (On prior appeal, summary judgment for defendants on a
statutory demurrer was reversed and the case remanded for trial with the holding that
plaintiff's statement of claim made out a prima facie case. At trial it appeared that
there had been a misjoinder of a party defendant and judgment was entered for
defendants, without prejudice. Plaintiff instituted the present suit and, on appeal from
judgment entered on a directed verdict for plaintiff, questions decided upon the prior
appeal were not reconsidered).
56. 330 Pa. 257, 199 Atl. 324 (1938).
57. 157 Cal. 339, 107 Pac. 699 (1910).
58. Id. at 341, 107 Pac. at 700.
59. 269 Pa. 19, 112 Atl. 120 (1920).
60. 267 Pa. 29, 110 Atl. 281 (1920).
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Bros. v. Greisser Constr. Co.,61 though not mentioning the "law of the case,"
was suitable for its application.
Perhaps the apparent confusion in the development of the law of the
case rule in Pennsylvania may be attributed to semantic difficulties. For, if
the terms "res judicata" and "law of the case" are used merely to denote that
a particular issue is "a matter adjudged, '6 2 it would not seem highly improper
to consider them substantially synonymous. For example, a question of law
considered and decided in a prior suit between the parties may become, under
the collateral estoppel effect of the rule of res judicata, a principle of law
which will be applied in a subsequent suit between the same parties. As such,
it might be said that it is the "law of the case" in that subsequent suit. It is
probable that many of the Pennsylvania cases using the term "law of the
case" intended it in that sense. Confusion arises, however, when the use of
the term "law of the case" is misunderstood to denote the rule which under-
lies the term, for the rules of res judicata and law of the case differ markedly
in the requirements for their application and in their effect.
63
The essential differences between the two rules are four in number: (1)
the nature of the prior adjudication needed for each to apply; (2) the degree
of conclusiveness each imparts to the prior decision; (3) the scope of matters
foreclosed from relitigation; and (4) the nature of the subsequent litigation
in which they may be applied.
As to the initial general difference, the rule of res judicata requires that
the prior adjudication must have resulted in a final judgment,6 4 regardless of
the level of the court finally disposing of the suit.65 Law of the case, on the
other hand, requires no final judgment--only that an appellate court has "con-
sidered and decided a question submitted to it on appeal." For example, the
law of the case rule has been expressly applied to render conclusive on a
subsequent appeal in the same case all matters considered and decided on a
prior appeal which resulted in a remand for trial66 or retrial. 67 The same
effect has been accomplished in many like cases without mention of the law of
the case rule or citation of authority, the court apparently feeling that there
61. 229 Pa. 512, 79 Atd. 147 (1911) (Where on previous appeal to superior court
certain issues as to validity of notice of a lien and of the lien itself were considered,
those issues will be treated as finally disposed of on appeal from judgment entered
after retrial, where the facts before the superior court were substantially the same as
on subsequent appeal).
62. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933).
63. "Res judicata settles the rights of the parties once the judgment has become
final. Law of the case does not settle any rights; it merely settles the law according
to which rights will be decided until the judgment is final." Note, 5 STAN. L. REv.
751, 754 (1953).
64. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 41 (1942) and cases collected in Pa. Anno. § 41.
65. 20 P.L.E. Judgment § 274 (1959).
66. Commonwealth by Truscott v. Binenstock, 366 Pa. 519, 77 A.2d 628 (1951).
67. Givens v. W. J. Gilmore Drug Co., 340 Pa. 361, 17 A.2d 184 (1941).
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was no need for extended discussion of matters decided on the prior appeal
where there had been no change in the law during the interim.68 In other
cases, though the rule has not been expressly applied, the appellate tribunal
has refused to reconsider questions on an appeal from the lower court's
entry of a decree69 or judgment7" in accordance with the opinion of the ap-
pellate court rendered on a prior appeal in the same case.
The above is not intended to imply that the law of the case rule is not
applicable where the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment as to part
of the matter concerned in the whole litigation. It has expressly been So
applied in cases involving subsequent accounts where there had been a prior
confirmation of a partial account or other final adjudication as to a question of
law arising earlier in the same estate.
71
The doctrines of res judicata and law of the case seem to overlap the
some extent where there has been a prior appellate proceeding in the same
case wherein a final judgment or decree has been rendered as to part of the
subject matter in litigation. The rule of res judicata would seem as appli-
cable in such a case 72 as would the law of the case rule defined in Reamer's
Estate. The law of the case rule as there defined does not expressly exclude
the application of the rule where there had been a final judgment or decree
rendered on the prior appeal as to part of the matter involved in the whole
litigation. But, if the rule of res judicata may be invoked in such a case,
the necessity for also considering the law of the case rule applicable seems
questionable.
Concerning the second general difference between the two rules, i.e., the
degree of conclusiveness each imparts, where the rule of res judicata applies, a
valid judgment may not be attacked collaterally on the ground that it was the
result of an error of law. 73 But the law of the case rule is subject to the
following exception to its conclusiveness:
[The law of the case rule] does not have the finality of the doctrine
of res judicata. "The prior ruling may have been followed as the
68. Eaton v. New York Life Ins. Co., 318 Pa. 532, 179 Atl. 67 (1935); Welker
v. Hazen, 247 Pa. 122, 93 Atl. 173 (1915) ; Thaler Bros. v. Greisser Const. Co., supra
note 61; Collins & Wood v. Busch, 15 Pa. Super. 255 (1900).
69. Hockfield v. Woloderker Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Pa. Super. 462 (1925).
70. Vulcanite Paving Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 244 Pa. 80, 90 Atl. 456 (1914)
Wray, Moore & Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., 77 Pa. Super. 486 (1921).
71. King's Estate, 361 Pa. 629, 66 A.2d 68 (1949) ; Reamer's Estate, supra note 48;
Lafferty's Estate, 230 Pa. 496, 79 Atl. 711 (1911).
72. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 41, comment c (1942) states that res judicata
applies where the judgment is final as to some matters in litigation although the litigation
continues as to others. For cases holding that determinations of fact in partial adjudi-
cations are conclusive in subsequent accounts, and other cases holding that prior adju-
dications on questions of law arising in a prior partial account create no estoppel for
later accounts, see Pa. Anno. § 41, comment c, pp. 232-33.




law of the case but there is a difference between such adherence and
res judicata; one directs discretion, the other supersedes it and com-
pels judgment. In other words, in one it is a question of power,
in the other of submission." . . . The rule of the "law of the case"
is one largely of convenience and public policy, both of which are
served by stability in judicial decisions, and it must be accom-
modated to the needs of justice by the discriminating exercise of
judicial power. Thus ...where a prior decision is palpably erro-
neous, it is competent for the court, not as a matter of right but of
grace, to correct it upon a second review where no wrong or in-
justice will result thereby, where no rights of property have become
vested, where no change has been made in the status of the parties
in reliance upon the former ruling, and where, following the decision
on a former appeal, the court in another case has laid down a dif-
ferent rule either expressly or by necessary implication overruling
the prior decision.7 4 (Emphasis the court's.)
As to differences in the scope of matters concluded by each rule, the
Pennsylvania application of the res judicata rule forecloses relitigation of
all matters which were75 or, in some cases, which might 76 have been con-
sidered and decided in reaching the prior decision. Law of the case, how-
ever, forecloses relitigation only of those matters which have been actually
considered and decided on prior appeal.77 In addition, where the law of the
case rule applies, matters considered and decided on the prior appeal are
conclusive only where the evidence is substantially the same as on the
prior appeal.
78
The fourth area of difference between the two rules, and the crucial
difference insofar as the noted case is concerned, is as to the nature of the
subsequent litigation in which each rule is applicable. Res judicata applies
to future suits between the same parties or their privies on the same or dif-
ferent cause of action and, in certain situations, to later proceedings in the
same case wherein a prior, partial judgment or decree has been rendered.
But by definition, it would appear that the law of the case rule would not
be appropriate in a second suit between the same parties--only in a sub-
sequent appeal on a later phase of the same case.79 Consequently, unless the
appeal in the noted case of Bonfitto v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.80 can be
74. Reamer's Estate, supra note 48, at 122-23, 200 Atl. at 37-38.
75. See cases collected in Pa. Anno § 70.
76. See cases collected in Pa. Anno., General Principles, pp. 21-22.
77. Reamer's Estate, supra note 48; see Fogel Refrigerator Co. v. Oteri, 398 Pa.
82, 156 A.2d 815 (1959) ; Welker v. Hazen, supra note 68; Creachen v. Bromley Bros.
Carpet Co., 214 Pa. 15, 6.1 Atl. 195 (1906) ; Cowen v. Pennsylvania Plate Glass Co.,
188 Pa. 542, 41 Atd. 615 (1898).
78. See Thaler Bros. v. Greisser Constr. Co., supra note 61; ,Creachen v. Bromley
Bros. Carpet Co., supra note 77.
79. See quotation accompanying note 23 supra.
80. 195 Pa. Super. 546, 172 A.2d 176 (1961).
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considered a subsequent appeal on a later phase of the case of Bonfitto v.
Bonfitto,o1 the application of the law of the case rule in the former would
appear erroneous. While there seem to be no Pennsylvania appellate deci-
sions directly in point on the question of whether the law of the case rule
applies to preclude litigation of issues arising in a second and separate suit
between the parties, the decision in Burke v. Pittsburgh Limestone Corp.
8 2
offers some persuasion that it does not.83
In the prior suit involved in the Burke8 4 case, a final and valid judg-
ment had been rendered for the defendant which was affirmed by both the
superior and supreme courts. Thereafter, the supreme court handed down
a decision in a different case involving a similar issue and stated that their
holding in the first Burke case (among others) was out of line with the
rational foundation of its decisions but that, because of stare decisis, would
not be overruled. The Burkes then brought a petition for a declaratory judg-
ment against the administrator of the estate of the defendant in the prior
case, contending that the intervening decision had changed the law applicable
to their controversy and, therefore, that they were entitled to judgment.
They were met by the defense of res judicata. From a trial court judgment
for defendants, the Burkes appealed to the supreme court. On appeal, they
contended that theirs was such a situation as would come under the excep-
tion to the conclusiveness of the "law of the case" rule8 5 and, therefore, that
it would be competent for the supreme court to reconsider the conclusions
reached on the prior appeal.86 The appellee argued to the contrary that only
res judicata was applicable and not the law of the case rule because the
latter only applies to "the still pending proceedings" and "within the four
corners of a particular litigation. 87 The supreme court, in affirming the
judgment for defendants, stated that "the argument of the appellants con-
fuses the rule of stare decisis, law of the case, and res judicata ;"°8 that "the
court is without authority to refuse to apply the doctrine"89 of res judicata,
81. 391 Pa. 187, 137 A.2d 277 (1958).
82. 375 Pa. 390, 100 A.2d 595 (1953).
83. Pa. Anno. § 41, comment c, at p. 222, states: "The term 'law of the case' is
commonly applied to a specie of res judicata, which renders a prior or preliminary
adjudication conclusive in later litigation in the same proceeding." 2 FREEMAN, JUDG-
MENTS § 630 (5th ed. 1925) states: "The doctrine of 'law of the case' relates entirely
to questions of law and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the
same case. . . ." For cases in other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that the
law of the case is not carried into subsequent cases, see 21 C.J.S. Courts § 195, n.20
(1940) ; 5B C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1821, n.58 (1958).
84. Supra note 82.
85. See quotation accompanying note 74 supra.
86. Brief for Appellants, p. 23, Burke v. Pittsburgh Limestone Corp., supra note 82.
87. Brief for Appellees Kerr et al., p. 5, Burke v. Pittsburgh Limestone Corp.,
supra note 82.
88. Burke v. Pittsburgh Limestone Corp., supra note 82, at 394, 100 A.2d at 598.
89. Id. at 395, 100 A.2d at 598.
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and that "any mistakes in the original judgment are wrapped up in that
judgment and cannot be inquired into thereafter."90
Admittedly, the supreme court in the Burke case did not specifically
state that the law of the case rule could not be applied on an appeal in a
subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies. It is also arguable
that the Burke case supports with equal force the proposition that though
the rule of the law of the case may apply in a second suit between the parties,
it would be superseded by the rule of res judicata where that rule may also
be applied. In addition, as has already been pointed out, the term "law of
the case" has been used in several Pennsylvania cases to describe the effect
of a decision reached in a prior case between the parties. But it is submitted
that the use of the term in those cases was as a synonym for "res judicata"
in the sense that that term is used to denote "a matter adjudged."
Moreover, none of the cases relied upon by the majority in Bonfitto v.
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.91 can be said to be authority for the proposition
that the law of the case rule extends to foreclose litigation of issues in a
subsequent suit between the same parties. Five of the cases there relied
upon were subsequent appeals in the same case on another phase of the same
case.9 2 The remaining three cases are distinguishable as res judicata cases. 93
In conclusion, it is submitted that there are several logical reasons why
the law of the case rule should not be extended to foreclose litigation of
questions arising in a subsequent suit between the same parties. First, the
extent of the application of the doctrine as defined in Reamer's Estate is that
it is appropriate in "subsequent appeal(s) on another phase of the same
case." Unless those words are to be relegated to the status of idle judicial
chatter, they would seem to exclude the application of the rule to foreclose
90. Id. at 397, 100 A.2d at 599.
91. Supra note 80.
92. These cases were Commonwealth by Truscott v. Binenstock, supra note 66;
Welker v. Hazen, supra note 68; Thaler Bros. v. Greisser Constr. Co., supra note 61;
Lafferty's Estate, supra note 71; Creachen v. Bromley Bros. Carpet Co., supra note 77.
93. These cases were Girard Trust Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 359 Pa. 319, 59
A.2d 124 (1948) (On appeal in prior suit by city for taxes claimed for year 1937,
supreme court held that the company was not liable for the tax. In this later suit by
the company, to recover 1934-1936 taxes, the ruling on appeal in the prior case that
company was not liable for the tax in 1937 is conclusive as to their liability for taxes
in 1934-1936. This case is cited in Pa. Anno. § 68, comment c, IV, as an example of
collateral estoppel); Allen v. Pennypacker, 302 Pa. 495, 153 Atl. 734 (1931) (On
appeal from rule absolute for attachment for contempt, prior supreme court decree finding
appellant a trustee ex malificio is conclusive as to that issue. This case is cited in Pa.
Anno. § 47, comment i, for the proposition that a judgment may not be attacked
collaterally in proceedings for its enforcement) ; McMahon's Estate, 215 Pa. 10, 64 Atl.
321 (1906) (On appeal, in estate of appellant's mother, from refusal of orphans' court
to stay proceedings until title to real property could be determined by an action at
law, dismissal of prior appeal by same party from an order overruling a motion to
quash proceedings in partition of same property in appellant's father's estate, is con-
clusive as a "prior adjudication").
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consideration of questions arising ii. ;absequent cases between the parties.
Second, the law of the case rule does not seem to have been created with
the intent that it should operate to preclude consideration of questions arising
in subsequent suits. A conclusion to the contrary would imply that the law
of the case rule was erected not only to fill a gap left by the rule of res
judicata, but was also meant to fulfill the idle purpose of overlapping into
areas wherein the rule of res judicata was perfectly adequate to accomplish
the desired result. Third, assuming that the law of the case rule is applicable
regardless of whether the prior decision had been appealed, and that it may
be invoked in a subsequent suit between the parties, the rules of civil pro-
cedure requiring that res judicata be affirmatively pleaded would be com-
pletely emasculated. Fourth, assuming that the law of the case rule may be
applied only where there had been a prior appellate decision, and that the
rule could be extended to subsequent suits between the parties, the anomalous
result would be that the court could not grant review as a matter of grace
where the former decision had not been appealed, but where the prior deci-
sion had been affirmed on appeal, it would be competent for the court to
grant review. Fifth, if the law of the case rule was intended to be extended
to subsequent cases, why was it not required to be pleaded by the procedural
rules, in like manner as res judicata?
ROBERT R. RICE
PICHIRILO v. GUZMAN: RIGHTS OF A LONGSHOREMAN
FOR UNSEAWORTHINESS IN A DEMISE CHARTER
A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, sitting in admiralty, vacated a decision of the District Court of
Puerto Rico imposing liability upon a shipowner for injuries incurred by a
longshoreman, resulting from the alleged unseaworthiness of the ship on
which he was working at the time of the injury. The case, Ruiz Pichirilo v.
Maysonet Guzman,l involved a demise charter2 under which the demisee,
who was also the libellant's employer, had maintained complete control of
the ship for some five years prior to the accident.3 The ship, the M/V Carib,
was being unloaded at San Juan, Puerto Rico, when the injury occurred. A
shackle supporting a boom of the ship broke, causing the boom to fall on
the libellant, who was working on deck at the time. The evidence showed
that the shackle had been recently bought.
The libel was brought in rem4 against the Carib and in personam against
the shipowner 5 for unseaworthiness arising ostensibly from the defective con-
dition of the shackle. The District Court found the vessel to be unseaworthy
as alleged and imposed liability on the ship and the vessel owner, Pichirilo.6
On appeal, the Circuit Court, in an opinion by Judge Aldrich, vacated the
judgment below and remanded with orders to dismiss, holding that the libel
in personam was barred because the unseaworthy condition obtained after
1. 290 F.2d 812 (Ist Cir. 1961), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 82 Sup. Ct. 176 (1961)
(No. 358).
2. In a demise charter, as distinguished from a time or voyage charter, command,
possession, and navigation of the vessel are vested solely in the demisee. This arrange-
ment is analogous to a lease of real property wherein the exclusive right to possession
is in the lessee, the lessor retaining only a reversion. It has been stated:
The test is one of "control"; if the owner retains control over the vessel, merely
carrying the goods furnished or designated by the charter, the charter is not
a demise; if the control of the vessel itself is surrendered to the charterer, so
that the master is his man and the ship's people are his people, then we have
to do with a demise.
GILMORE AND BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 4-21 (1957).
3. The District Court had ruled that no demise existed, but the Circuit Court,
considering that ruling clearly erroneous, held that a demise was established by the
evidence. Pichirilo v. Guzman, supra note 1, at 813. That a demise charter did exist
is assumed herein; however, on appeal, the issue of the propriety of the 'Circuit Court's
ruling will be before the Supreme Court.
4. The maritime in rem proceeding is unique in that it is literally a suit "against
the ship," the vessel itself being considered a distinct party defendant. Furthermore,
an action in rem will lie only when the subject of the claim is a maritime lien, such
as an action for seaman's wages or an action based on the unseaworthiness of a ship.
See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. City of Athens, 83 F. Supp. 67 (D. Md. 1949) ; GILMORE
AND BLACK, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 9-1 to 9-4.
5. Libellant Guzman, who had received a compensation allowance from the State
Insurance Fund pursuant to the Puerto Rico Workmen's Compensation Act, 11
L.P.R.A. ch. 1 (1935), was thereby precluded from bringing any action against his
employer, the demisee.
6. Guzman v. M/V Carib, Admiralty No. 39-58, D. Puerto Rico, Oct. 16, 1959.
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the demise, and that the libel in rem failed in the absence of any personal
liability. This Note will consider these holdings in light of the development
and ramifications of the doctrine of unseaworthiness.
In its origin, the doctrine of unseaworthiness was merely a device
enabling insurers to avoid indemnifying owners for the loss of ships and
goods at sea3 The initial application to seamen occurred in cases of desertion
of vessels or abandonment of ships' duties by crew members, such derelic-
tions normally being punishable by forfeiture of wages. Upon a showing
that the vessel was unseaworthy, the seamen were permitted to recover
wages due.8 The next step involved the famous "second proposition" of The
Osceola,9 an unprecedented dictum that a ship and its owner would incur
liability to indemnify a seaman for personal injury resulting from the un-
seaworthiness of the ship. The nature of such an indemnity was subse-
quently clarified by Judge Augustus N. Hand in The Scandrett,10 an action
for personal injury based on unseaworthiness in the absence of negligence."
Reviewing the authorities, Judge Hand concluded that the duty to furnish a
seaworthy ship was absolute. 12  This evolution constitutes a remarkable
example of common law growth and change, if not "a frank excursion into
7. 1 CAINES, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE LAW MERCHANT OF THE UNITED STATES
308 (1802).
8. See Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755 (No. 3930) (D. Pa. 1789).
9. 189 U.S. 158 (1903). The four "propositions," stated in the opinion, supra at
175, are substantially as follows: (1) that the vessel and its owner are liable for any
sickness or injury of a seaman to the extent of his maintenance and cure and for
his wages to the end of the voyage; (2) that the vessel and its owner are liable to
indemnify a seaman for injuries received as a consequence of the unseaworthiness of
the ship; (3) that all crew members except the master are fellow servants, and injuries
sustained through the negligence of a fellow servant are not compensable beyond the
allowance for maintenance and cure; and (4) that injuries occasioned by accident or
the negligence of the master or any crew member are not compensable beyond the
allowance for maintenance and cure. The Osceola case was a negligence action, the
decision holding that a vessel would not incur liability in rem predicated upon the
negligence of its master; hence, propositions (1), (3), and (4) were germane to
the issue at hand. Notwithstanding its questionable origin, however, the "second
proposition" was destined to take its place among the legal classics.
10. 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937).
11. The alleged unseaworthiness was based on a defective ship's doorknob, and
the jury had found that the defect "was hidden and latent and not discoverable by
ordinary inspection by competent inspectors." Id. at 710.
12. In further justification of his decision, Judge Hand noted that shipowners are
in a position to insure against similar mishaps, thereby treating such liability as a
business expense. Id. at 711.
Any lingering doubts regarding the vitality of this proposition were finally dis-
pel-led by Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1943), a case involving
negligently-caused unseaworthiness, wherein the Court voiced approval of The Scandrett:
The Osceola .. . laid down . .. the rule of the owner's unqualified obligation
to furnish seaworthy appliances . . . . It nowhere intimated that the owner
is relieved from liability for providing an unseaworthy appliance, merely
because the unseaworthiness was attributable to the negligence of fellow servants
of the injured seaman rather than to the negligence of the owner. Supra at 101.
(Emphasis added.)
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[judicial] legislation.' 3 However, it is generally conceded that the doctrine
is warranted by the perilous circumstances and accommodations foisted upon
a sailor, who has no choice but to stay with his ship, seaworthy or un-
worthy, when underway at sea.
A definition which might be extracted from the variety of conditions
which have been held to constitute unseaworthiness is elusive at best, but
it seems clear that an "appurtenance" of the vessel, rendered defective, is
requisite. Obviously, injuries caused by defective appliances and equipment
of the vessel 14 fall within the confines of the doctrine. Likewise, a crew
member known to have pugnacious proclivities 15 may render his ship un-
seaworthy. Equipment brought on board by longshoremen 6 will satisfy the
test. Furthermore, appliances in themselves entirely fit, if operated in a
negligent manner, may provide instances (or instants) of "transitory un-
seaworthiness.' 7 However, equipment or cargo which has not yet become
"appurtenant," such as a crate being lowered into a ship's hold, has been
held to be outside the scope of the remedy18 -- but the moment the object is
settled on deck it may satisfy the standard. 19
A line of cases involving ships in "moth-balls," or undergoing major
structural repairs, establishes that workmen whose job it is to render a ship
seaworthy can hardly be heard to complain of a defect which contributes to
the very unseaworthiness they were employed to correct.2 0  In these cases
13. Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and The Rights of Harbor Workers, 39
CORNELL L.Q. 381, 401 (1954).
14. The H. A. Scandrett, supra note 10 (doorknob) ; McAllister v. Magnolia Pet-
roleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958) (wet ladder); Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co.,
supra note 12 (rope supplied by mate) ; Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, 364 U.S. 325
(1960) (wrench).
15. Boudoin v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Co., Inc., 348 U.S. 336 (1955) (assault
by crew member); The Rolph, 299 Fed. 52 (C.C. Cal. 1924) (beatings at hands of
mate).
16. DeVan v. Pa. R.R. Co., 167 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (cargo hook);
Considine v. Black Diamond Steamship Corp., 163 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1958)
(chisel-truck).
17. Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959) (overloaded
winch) ; DiSalvo v. Cunard Steamship Co., 171 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (poorly
rigged baggage chute) ; Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960) (slime
on rail).
18. Carabellese v. Naviera Aznar, S.A., 285 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 872 (1961).
19. Reddick v. McAllister Lighterage Line, Inc., 258 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 908 (1958).
20. West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959); Noel v. Isbrandtsen Company,
287 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 975 (1961) ; Latus v. United States,
277 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960). In West v. United
States, supra at 122, the Court concluded:
It would be an unfair contradiction to say that the owner held the vessel out
as seaworthy in [a case involving reactivation of a ship in the "moth-ball fleet"].
It would appear that the focus should be upon the status of the ship, the pattern
of the repairs, and the extensive nature of the work contracted to be done,
rather than the specific type of work that each of the numerous shore-based
workmen is doing on shipboard at the moment of injury.
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the courts have concluded that the status of a deactivated vessel does not
comport with a warranty of seaworthiness to any person, thereby obviating
the necessity of determining whether or not the nature of the injured person's
employment justifies an award based on unseaworthiness. This reasoning is
strictly limited to ships incapable of going to sea, for in all other instances
the type of work being performed by the libellant should be controlling-this
is in consonance with the apparent purpose of the doctrine, that is, the pro-
tection of all those subject to the vicissitudes of the life at sea.
21
It is clear in the Pichirilo case that the equipment in question (boom
and shackle) was clearly "appurtenant" and that the status of the Carib was
such that she did warrant her seaworthiness. Furthermore, it has been well
settled since the case of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki22 that the absolute duty
to provide and maintain seaworthy appliances is owed to stevedores and
longshoremen performing loading and unloading operations. Sieracki was
a stevedore employed by an independent contractor; hence, no actual privity
or warranty from the shipowner existed. Although the doctrine of unsea-
worthiness had been declared not incompatible with negligence, nevertheless
it was thought to be essentially non-delictual. This 1hesis was expounded
by the respondent in Sieracki,23 and his argument was strengthened by allu-
sion to the accepted term, "warranty of seaworthiness," which seemed to
imply a contractual duty with an attendant privity requirement. The Court,
however, had little difficulty disposing of this argument: "It is essentially
a species of liability without fault . . . neither limited by conceptions of
negligence nor contractual in character . . .a form of absolute duty owing to
all within the range of its humanitarian policy." 24 The Court further in-
dicated that anyone "performing the ship's service with the owner's con-
sent" 25 was within this broad range. The case thus marked the incorporation
of longshoremen "performing the ship's work" 26 into the realm of the duty
owed previously only to seamen.
The question of in personam liability in the Pichirilo case turns on the
issue of the demise charter, because of the determination that the ship-
21. It is submitted that in borderline cases, such as ships undergoing "minor
structural repairs" or shipyard availabilities, any doubts should be resolved in favor of
"activation," leaving the warranty question to turn on nature of employment.
22. 328 U.S. 85 (1945).
23. Id. at 90-93.
24. Id. at 94, 95.
25. Id. at 97.
26. Although Sieracki has been criticized on the grounds that, as an historical
fact, the unloading of vessels has never been performed by seamen (Tetreault, supra
note 13, at 413, 414), this academic inconsistency may perhaps be reconciled by view-
ing the loading and unloading processes as sufficiently integral in a ship's cycle of
operation to be considered "ship's service"-in any event, the proposition of duty owed




owner's duty to maintain his vessel's seaworthiness ceases when he delivers
the ship to the demisee. This issue involves a balancing of the non-delegable
character of the duty owed against the demise arrangement whereby the
respondent owner-demisor relinquishes all control of the vessel to the
demisee. Militating against the owner's liability in this situation is a
respected corollary to a demise, that the demisee becomes owner pro hac vice
(herein ostensibly for the purpose of incurring liability for unseaworthi-
ness) .27 There is no question that the demisee stands in the owner's shoes
in situations involving collision and negligence.28 Furthermore, several
decisions have held that the putative "ownership" of the demisee bars an
action based on unseaworthiness arising after the demise against the actual
owner, 29 the reasoning being substantially as follows: notwithstanding the
non-delegable aspect of the duty, some privity should exist to justify foisting
liability upon the owner-why should he incur liability for a condition over
which he has no control?
This reasoning was dispositive of the case of Canella v. Lykes Bros. S.
S. Co.,80 wherein the court denied recovery in personam against the owner,
indicating however that the controlling factor was that the defect had ob-
tained after the demise. Otherwise (had the defect existed at the time the
owner turned over the vessel to the demisee) the liability of the owner in
personam would follow because, at some previous time, he had been in a
position to correct it. Similar holdings have occurred in Vitozi v. Balboa
Shipping Co.3' and Lopez v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co.,5 2 both of
which cases concerned only the question of liability in an action in personam
against the owner out of control.8 3 The decision in Pichirilo cites these
27. See Leary v. United States, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 607 (1871); GILMORE AND
BLAC K, op. cit. supra note 2, at 218.
28. Thorp v. Hammond, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 408 (1870) ; The Barnstable, 181
U.S. 464, 468 (1901) (dictum) ; Santiago v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 425 (S.D. N.Y.
1952).
29. Lopez v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 201 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 976 (1953) ; Cannella v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 174 F.2d 794 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 859 (1949); Vitozi v. Balboa Shipping Co., 163 F.2d
286 (1st Cir. 1947). The opinion in the latter case asserted that the demise prevented
any action based on unseaworthiness against the general owner, irrespective of when
the defect developed, but in Pichirilo, supra note I, at 813, 814, Judge Aldrich notes:
Possibly we erred in extending this rule [in the Vitozi case, supra] indis-
criminately to cases where the unseaworthy condition preceded the demise ...
But we see no reason to reconsider when, as here, the defective condition
arose only after the owner had parted with all possession.
30. Supra note 29, at 795.
31. Supra note 29.
32. Ibid.
33. Both Vitozi and Lopez were longshoremen employed by demise charterers.
Both decisions invoked the ownership of the demisee pro hac vice to defeat recovery in




cases with approval, and then concludes that in the absence of any personal
liability (of the owner-demisor because of lack of control and of the demisee
because of the workmen's compensation statute), in rem liability would be
unrealistic because it could only be predicated upon an archaic notion of the
"personification" of a ship which gives rise to independent liability. In
this vein, the court stated:
The concept of a ship as an individual may have an aura of romance
befitting the lore of the sea, but to regard it as an entity having
separate responsibilities independent of the primary legal responsi-
bility of some human actor has little rational appeal. This is not
to say that the "personification" of the vessel is not a convenient
shorthand method of expressing legal results.34
But is control, or the ability to correct, the sine qua non of the in personam
action? Could liability in rem have no other basis than the "personification"
theory?
Assuming that liability for unseaworthiness need not be predicated upon
negligence, 35 the conclusion is inescapable that the denial of recovery in
personam in Pichirilo was based on a presumed transfer, from owner to
demisee, of the duty to furnish and maintain a seaworthy vessel. Yet this
proposition may be questioned in the light of principles set forth in the
Sieracki case36 and the case of Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson.
3 7
In Sieracki, notwithstanding that the shipowner maintained control of
the vessel during the loading process and that the injury was caused by ship's
gear, the Court did not avoid the practical issue of control. Well aware that
the loading operations were under the exclusive direction of the independent
stevedoring contractor, the Court noted that the obligation of seaworthiness
"is peculiarly and exclusively the obligation of the [ship's] owner ....
It is one he cannot delegate.138 The Court further indicated that in personam
liability without fault, under these circumstances, was justified by the
hazardous nature of marine service and the inability of seamen and long-
shoremen to protect themselves against the perils inherent therein, and
accordingly concluded:
Those risks are avoidable by the owner to the extent that they may
result from negligence. And beyond this he is in position, as the
worker is not, to distribute the loss in the shipping community
which receives the service and should bear its cost. (Emphasis
added.) 9
34. Pichirilo v. Guzman, supra note 1, at 814.
35. Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., supra note 12; Sieracki v. Seas Shipping
Co., supra note 22.
36. Supra note 22.
37. 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
38. Supra note 22, at 100.
39. Id. at 94.
[Vol. 6
RECENT CASES
The facts of the Petterson40 case more nearly approach Pichirilo in
that, in the former, the vessel owner had released control to the injured
stevedore's employer, albeit of only a part of the ship and only for a very
limited time. However, the injury to Petterson did occur within that limited
time, on that part of the vessel released, and as a result of defective equip-
ment brought on board by the stevedoring contractor.41 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit had rejected the argument that the shipowner was
exempt from liability for unseaworthiness arising after surrender of control
of the ship to the stevedores, reasoning that that theory could only be based
on negligence, and that Sieracki unequivocally released the unseaworthiness
action from its shackles of culpability. The court also indicated that it was
impelled to its conclusion by "the reference in the Sieracki opinion to the
'common core of policy which has been controlling' which is found running
through the decisions permitting longshoremen to recover from ship-
owners . "42 The court granted recovery in personam against the owner,
and the Supreme Court affirmed per curiam.43  In so holding, it relied
solely on Sieracki and Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,44 a similar case where-
in a carpenter, employed by an independent contractor, had been allowed to
recover against the shipowner in an action based on negligence and unsea-
worthiness, the latter consisting of an uncovered hatch hole through which
the libellant had accidentally fallen.
Bearing in mind the fundamental dissimilarity between Petterson and
Pichirilo (i.e., the existence of a demise charter in the latter), it may be
questioned whether absolute liability in personam of the shipowner in the
Petterson case is any less harsh than similar liability would be in Pichirilo,
and if not, whether the magic appellation "owner pro hac vice" should be
allowed to dictate such an inconsistency. In the Vitozi, Cannella, and Lopez
cases, 45 Judge Aldrich found good authority for denying recovery in personam
against the demisor; however, this rule seems to run counter to the "com-
mon core of policy."'46 It has been suggested that "the emphasis [in the
area of unseaworthiness] has shifted from situs to status, from geography to
policy." 47 Viewing the unseaworthiness action in perspective, from The
40. Supra note 37.
41. Id. at 479. It was not clear whether the offending equipment, which was a
block, belonged to the ship or to the stevedoring contractor, but for purposes of the
appeal, it was assumed to belong to the latter.
42. Id. at 480.
43. Supra note 37.
44. 346 U.S. 406 (1953). Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion, Id. at 419, contains
an excellent account of the extreme privations encountered by seamen, which are
responsible for their favored position as "wards of the admiralty."
45. Supra note 29.
46. Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson, supra note 37, at 480.
47. DiSalvo v. Cunard Steamship Co., supra note 17, at 819.
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Osceola to date, it becomes apparent that a distinct philosophy has steadily
developed, in consonance perhaps with an increased awareness of the un-
avoidable dangers encountered so frequently by all those performing the
maritime service, and reflected in the great volume of personal injury litiga-
tion in this area. If the shipping industry is unable to eliminate these hazards,
perhaps it may be expected to bear the costs of their results. As between
Guzman and Pichirilo, little question is presented as to the better loss
distributor.
Turning to the issue of liability of the Carib in rem, it must be borne
in mind that Judge Aldrich considered the presence of personal liability a
condition precedent to recovery in rem, and accordingly found for the
respondent. In so holding he has leveled a challenge at the very essence of
the maritime in rem proceeding, 48 at least insofar as it has been conceived in
relation to the doctrine of unseaworthiness. The iconoclasticism of this
challenge is enlightened by the dubious support accorded his decision by his
best authorities. In Burns Bros. v. The Central R.R. of New Jersey,49 a case
involving collision, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a
finding of liability in rem even though the owner of the offending vessel had
been personally exculpated in a prior adjudication. 50 In Noel v. Isbrandtsen
Company,51 the libellant's theory in rem was predicated on personal injury
apart from any warranty of seaworthiness, and was summarily rejected by
the court. Implicit in the language of the decision, however, is an assumption
that personal liability would not be a condition of liability in rem in an
action for unseaworthiness.
52
Why then should liability in personam not constitute a condition pre-
cedent to a successful unseaworthiness action in rem? Why has this proposi-
tion remained unquestioned since its inception, when only a reliance or
"personification" could sustain it? Is its sustenance still rooted in fiction?
Or have other considerations dictated its retention?
It is noteworthy that Judge Learned Hand, in Grillea v. United States,58
48. See note 4 supra.
49. 202 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1953).
50. Burns Bros. v. Long Island R. Co., 176 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1949). The barge
owner, Central R.R. of New Jersey, was exonerated because the collision had been
chargeable solely to the negligence of the bailee and possessor of the barge, the Long
Island R. Co., which was adjudged personally liable. The subsequent proceeding in
rem (supra note 49), however, was necessitated by Burns Bros.' inability to satisfy
its judgment against the Long Island R. Co., which had gone into reorganization.
51. Supra note 20.
52. Commenting on libellant's novel theory of liability in rem, the court noted:
It is one thing to hold that a conviction or liability in personam is not a condi-
tion precedent to the action in rem; it would be quite another to say that the
vessel may be held accountable as an entity when there has been no violation of
the warranty of seaworthiness .... (Emphasis added.)
Noel v. Isbrandtsen Company, supra note 20, at 786.
53. 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956). The action was brought by a longshoreman for
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a case involving a demise charter, was likewise confronted by the thorny
question of independent liability in rem in an action based on unseaworthi-
ness. Relying on policy considerations, including the vessel owner's ability
to distribute the loss, as set forth in Sieracki and Petterson, Judge Hand
imposed liability, likening the in rem recovery to "a kind of 'Workmen's
Compensation Act'; though limited by the value of the ship .... ," Nowhere
in this opinion is there any mention of the "personification" of the ship.
Judge Aldrich, in the Pichirilo decision, points out:
[I]t is true that in Grillea v. United States ... the court reached the
opposite result. It did so without discussion, and with only the
simple statement, "we see no reason why a person's property should
never be liable unless he or someone else is liable 'in personam' "....
With all deference we think so novel a principle needs more support
than a statement that the court sees no reason against it.s5
But was not Judge Hand merely acknowledging what he considered settled
law, and suggesting a policy as the real motivation for his rejection of the
proposed qualification to independent liability in rem? Should liability in
rem require, or depend upon, personal liability which would itself be in-
dependent of fault? If an unseaworthiness action in personam were to
necessitate a showing of negligence, then the inconsistency of a naked
recovery in rem would be patent; since, however, the liability in personam
is absolute, it would seem unrealistic to encumber the action in rem with
such a requirement. 56
In Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser,5 7 the Supreme Court cited
Grillea for the proposition that a turnover of control of a ship to a stevedor-
ing company during unloading operations does not include a delegation of
injuries sustained when he fell through a hatch. The hatch had been rendered unsea-
worthy by the libellant and his companion, who had placed thereon the wrong hatch
cover. This condition had not existed when the respondent demised the vessel.
The libel was actually brought in personam against the United States because the
Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 741 (1958) denies the right
to a libel in rem against a vessel owned or chartered by the sovereign. However, the
Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 STAT. 525, 526 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 742, 743 (1958),
grants a right in personam against the United States "wherever it shall appear that
had the vessel or cargo been privately owned and possessed a libel in rem might have
been maintained"; hence, the adjudication proceeded on principles applicable to a libel
in rem against a vessel owned by a private person.
54. Id. at 923.
55. Pichirilo v. Guzman, 290 F.2d 812, 815 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. granted, - U.S.
82 Sup. Ct. 176 (1961) (No. 358).
56. Judge Hand observed in Grillea that, "[To say that a person's property should
never be liable unless he or someone else is liable 'in personam'] would amount to
saying that there should be no limited liability without fault, although unlimited liability
without fault is not infrequently imposed." Grillea v. United States, supra note 53,
at 924.
57. 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
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the duty to maintain the vessel's seaworthiness.58 The Crumady case was
clearly distinguishable, however, from Grillea and Pichirilo, because it did
not involve a demise charter and the libellant was not an employee of the
negligent stevedoring contractor, whose liability, therefore, was not limited
by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 59
The negligence of the stevedoring contractor in Crumady did permit
of a third-party action whereby the respondent was allowed indemnity in a
"recovery over" against the former, not however on a negligence theory
but rather because of an implied indemnity provision in the contracting
agreement. 60 In cases where such a written agreement between owner and
independent contractor (who may also be a demisee) does exist, the courts
have seized upon this contract to allow the vessel owner to recover over in
a third-party suit based on breach of warranty (express or implied) of
workmanlike service. This right-over allows ultimate liability to rest on the
real offender but incidentally frustrates, by a circuity of action, the purpose
of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.61 In
Grillea an express indemnity provision was alluded to by Judge Hand, but
apparently not as a basis for his decision. While it might be contended that
the existence of secondary liability was dispositive of the Grillea case, and
that therefore Pichirilo (wherein no secondary liability existed, because the
demise agreement was oral) stands apart even from Grillea, it should be
noted that the third-party suit is always ancillary to primary liability. Since
the issue of third-party liability can never arise until primary liability is
fixed, any reasoning whereby the latter is made to depend upon the former
seems unduly attenuated. Judge Aldrich noted that, "Grillea has resulted in
some discussion of the effect of an indemnity clause in the demise . . . . We
would agree . . . that the existence of an indemnity clause is beside the
point."62 Would not any other conclusion actually be a tacit admission that
liability for unseaworthiness is not absolute and independent, but merely a
convenient means of circumventing the limitations of the Longshoremen's
Act?
58. Id. at 427.
59. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1959). This statute, which pro-
vides compensation for injuries occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States,
allows the stevedore to recover against his employer to the prescribed extent or to
elect to proceed independently against third persons.
60. The actual provision of the agreement from which the indemnity was implied
was "to faithfully furnish such stevedoring services." Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik
Fisser, supra note 57, at 428. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship
Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); see generally, White, A New Look at the Shipowner's
Right-Over for Shipboard Injuries, 12 STAN. L. REV. 717 (1960).
61. Supra note 59.
62. Pichirilo v. Guzman, supra note 55, at 815.
[Vol. 66
RECENT CASES
Two recent opinions, Leotta v. The S.S. Esparta3 and Reed v. The
Yaka,64 both virtually indistinguishable from Grillea, have accepted the
reasoning of the latter. In The Esparta the court recognized that the demisee
was owner pro hac vice and that the defect had not existed when the ship
was demised, but concluded that "[t]he shipowner is always there in the
background." 65 In The Yaka, the court, commenting on the demisee's owner-
ship pro hac vice, noted, "That is a term of art, '66 and pointed out that the
shipowner "does retain the right to the return of his ship at some future
time."'67 These cases clearly do not rely on "personification," but rather seem
to invoke the owner-demisor's reversion in the ship in justification of inde-
pendent absolute liability in rem, which thesis seemingly bespeaks a reliance
on policy considerations.
It seems possible, then, that the personification theory, like so many
other legal fictions, has served as a make-weight, allowing the courts to
achieve what they considered reasonable results with minimal ripples on
the judicial calm. As the principle becomes established, the fiction, having
served its purpose, becomes obscure and is supplanted by the compelling
considerations which justified its initial utilization. If this be true, then it
would seem that the identical policy consideration, that is, a solicitude for
the lot of those performing shipboard work because of the inherently danger-
ous nature of this calling, underlies recoveries in rem and in personam for
unseaworthiness. Perhaps the unseaworthiness doctrine should therefore
be considered a primary head of maritime liability, with complementary
incidents of in rem and in personam recovery, rather than a theory some-
what subservient to these procedural devices. The Supreme Court, in
Pichirilo, would then be presented only with the question: shall a longshore-
man be precluded from bringing an action based on the unseaworthiness of a
ship demised to his employer?
ADDISON M. BOWMAN III
63. 188 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
64. 183 F. Supp. 69 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
65. Supra note 63, at 169.
66. Supra note 64, at 76.
67. Ibid.
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MICHAEL v. HAHNEMANN MEDICAL COLLEGE AND
HOSPITAL: CHARITABLE IMMUNITY AFFIRMED?
In the recent case of Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College and Hospi-
tal,' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the immunity of charitable
corporations from tort liability. The adjudication involved appeals of two
lawsuits: one a death and survival action for negligent failure to give treat-
ment which would prevent the contraction of tetanus; the other an action
for the performance of an operation which materially differed from that
prescribed by the staff physician, and as a result of which the plaintiff became
permanently disabled. The appeals were taken from the respective trial
courts after they granted motions for judgments on the pleadings on the
ground that defendants were eleemosynary institutions and therefore not
subject to tort liability. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.
The sharply divergent views which the several justices of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania took regarding the doctrine of charitable immunity
compel an analysis of the reasoning behind their respective positions in this
matter.
2
The doctrine of charitable immunity has been attacked and repudiated
in many American jurisdictions.3 In Pennsylvania, charitable corporations
have enjoyed immunity from tort liability since 1888 when Fire Insurance
Patrol v. Boyd 4 held that "A public charity, whether incorporated or not,
is but a trustee and is bound to apply its funds in furtherance of the charity
and not otherwise."' This so-called trust fund theory of charitable immunity
originated in England by way of dictum in Duncan v. FindlaterO and was
later followed in Feofee's of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross,7 where it was held
that "To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those
1. 404 Pa. 424, 172 A.2d 769 (1961).
2. Four of the seven justices who heard the Hahneinann appeal stated that they
are in favor of abolishing charitable immunity. However, one of the jour, Justice Bok,
sided with the present majority even though he was in favor of abolishing the doctrine.
Justice Bok believes that a repudiation of charitable immunity should operate prospec-
tively rather than retroactively to protect those charities which have not taken out
insurance but rely upon the doctrine of charitable immunity.
3. PROSSER, TORTS § 109 (2d ed. 1955). It is there stated that only 12 states have
retained complete charitable immunity. Since then, Wisconsin has repudiated charitable
immunity in the case of Kojis v. Doctor's Hospital, - Wis. -, 107 N.W.2d 131 (1961).
Missouri adopted modified immunity in Blatt v. George H. Nettleton Home for Aged
Women, note 28 infra. Idaho rejected charitable immunity in Wheat v. Idaho Falls
Latter Day Saints Hospital, 78 Idaho 60, 297 P.2d 1041 (1956). Kentucky adopted
modified immunity in Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese of Louisville, 301 S.W.2d 574
(Ky. 1957).
4. 120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl. 553 (1888).
5. Id. at 647, 648, 15 Atl. at 557.
6. 6 Cl. & Fin. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839).
7. 12 Cl. & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).
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objects whom the author of the fund had in view, but would be to direct
it to a completely different purpose."
'8
As it was on the basis of the trust fund theory that charitable immunity
was originally adopted as the law of Pennsylvania, it is submitted that the
trust fund theory is not a sound basis for the retention of the doctrine of
charitable immunity, Duncan v. Findlater having been overruled by Mersey
Docks Trustees v. Gibbs.9 This latter case changed the law with respect to
the immunity of trust funds and abolished charitable immunity in England
before it was ever adopted by Pennsylvania.10 If the trust fund theory, the
basis of charitable immunity, is rejected, it would seem to follow that a
repudiation of immunity is in order. However, its very existence gives
rise to additional factors which make the question of affirmance or repudiation
a difficult one to resolve. There must be careful consideration of the addi-
tional financial burdens which repudiation might place upon charitable
corporations and a balancing of the importance of adherence to stare decisis
to the right of redress which usually accrues to one injured through the fault
of another.
The importance of adhering to stare decisis is stressed by Justice Bell,
who states that, "The minority opinion would overrule without any legal
justification decisions of this court covering a period of over 70 years, and
would not only disregard, but would effectually obliterate the last vestiges of
the wise, salutory and time-tested principle of Stare Decisis."'1 Justice Bell's
respect for stare decisis and the important role it plays in an orderly and
predictable legal system is an important factor. However, this would seem
to be overemphasized in light of Justice Musmanno's forceful dissenting
opinion that "Stare decisis is not an iron mold into which every legal principle
must be poured where, like wet concrete, it acquires an unyielding rigidity
which nothing later can change.
1 2
Public policy considerations will necessarily come to bear on the ultimate
8. Id. at 513, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1510.
9. XI H.L.C. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866).
10. The date of Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs was 1866 while that of Fire
Insurance Patrol v. Boyd was 1888.
When one considers other legal responsibilities with which charities are saddled it
is even more difficult to accept the trust fund theory. An eminent authority on corpora-
tions contends that "no court can consistently adopt the trust fund theory and then
hold the corporation to any liability whatsoever, in any case or to any plaintiff."
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4928 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1961). Based upon the
foregoing, it is difficult, if not impossible, to answer Justice Musmanno's query of how
can it be consistent for a charitable corporation to pay Workmen's Compensation while
denying recovery in an ordinary negligence action for the same type of injury. Michael
v. Hahnemann, supra note 1, at 462, 172 A.2d at 788.
11. Id. at 429, 172 A.2d at 772. Query whether or not there is "legal justification"
for overruling charitable immunity.
12. Id. at 456, 172 A.2d at 785.
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fate of charitable immunity. There are strong arguments in favor of the
retention of the doctrine. It is unquestioned that nonprofit institutions such
as rest homes, institutions of higher education, and charitable hospitals,
perform an indispensable service to great numbers of people annually.
Indirectly, at least, these institutions are of benefit to the general public.
The problem is whether, in guaranteeing tort recovery to a few individuals,
we would be risking an appreciable diminution in the amount of funds
applied to charitable purposes. Justice Bell avers that charitable immunity
is necessary, not only to protect the funds of eleemosynary institutions, but
to insure a constant and undiminished flow of donations from the public.'
3
He feels that public-minded benefactors will be deterred from contributing to
charitable institutions if the donation might be diverted to answering tort
claims.
14
The policy arguments in favor of charitable tort liability are also
meritorious.' 5 The law of torts is intended to reimburse persons for the
injuries they suffer as a result of the wrongful acts of others. To deny
recovery on the basis of charitable immunity is equivalent to forcing the
injured party to make a contribution to the charity in the amount of the loss
which he has suffered. The amount involved in the tort claim may be small
as compared to some charitable gifts. which have been made by certain
philanthropists. Nevertheless, a person who foregoes his tort claim may
suffer since he will be making a contribution which he can not afford."
In addition to the primary purpose of the law of torts, i.e., to make the
injured party whole, the Hahnemann case alluded to the idea that one can
expect more care to be exercised when the actor is aware that he has a
financial responsibility for damage done by his negligent acts.' 7 Further, it
13. Id. at 436, 172 A.2d at 775.
14. Bell believes that the drying up of contributions will necessitate government
funds and in the case of hospitals could result in socialized medicine.
15. Justice Musmanno answers the argument made by Justice Bell, that to subject
a charity to large tort claims would discourage contributors, by implementing a state-
ment made by Justice Rutledge in the case of President and Directors of Georgetown
College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (U.S. App. D.C. 1942):
No statistical evidence has been presented to show that the mortality or crippling
of charities has been greater in states which impose full or partial liability than
where complete or substantially full immunity is given. Nor is there evidence
that deterrence of donation has been greater in the former. 'Charities seem to
survive and increase in both with little apparent heed to whether they are liable
for torts or difference in survival capacity.
Michael v. Hahnemann, supra note 1, at 468, 172 A.2d at 791.
16. The immunity of charitable corporations in tort is based upon very dubious
grounds. It would seem that a sound social policy ought, in fact, to require
such organizations to make just compensation for harm legally caused by their
activities under the same circumstances as individuals, before they carry out their
charitable activities. The policy of law requiring individuals to be just before
generous seems equally applicable to charitable corporations.
HARPER, TORTS 657 § 294 (1933).
17. Michael v. Hahnemann, supra note 1, at 453, 172 A.2d at 784.
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would seem that officials of charitable corporations would select more quali-
fied employees and stress proper safety precautions if they were not immune
from tort liability.
The argument that it is more important to protect the funds of a charity
than to recognize the rights of an injured individual, because of the great
benefits derived from charitable institutions, is very persuasive on its face.
However, this rationale is based on the faulty assumption that it is impossible
for charities to protect the bulk of their funds and at the same time discharge
their tort obligations. A charity could obtain this protection and at the same
time discharge its obligations simply by paying an annual insurance premium
which would hardly be a serious burden.18
As a compromise between affirmance and complete repudiation of
charitable immunity some jurisdictions have adopted modified immunity.
Modified immunity grants immunity to charitable corporations in some situa-
tions, but imposes tort liability under other circumstances. The "waiver
theory" is one that confines charitable immunity to those persons who stand
in direct beneficial relation to the charity. This form of modified immunity
combines a recognition of sound legal principles with respect for the purely
charitable actions which Justice Musmanno argues are the exception rather
than the rule today. Jurisdictions subscribing to the waiver theory, or as
sometimes denoted, the "Stranger Theory," hold that charitable corporations
should be liable for the torts of their servants, with the single exception that
one who is reaping the benefits of the charity is not permitted to "bite the
hand that feeds it" and recover damages from his benefactor. In accepting
the benefits of the charity, one is said to "waive" all tort claims which may
arise during the period in which he is so aided.19
Although there is perhaps much to be said in favor of the waiver theory,
a basic objection is that it is not in fact a waiver at all. When one seeks
aid from a charitable institution he would hardly consider whether or not
the institution will be liable for its negligence in treating or otherwise bene-
fiting him. Obviously, the waiver is given without the knowledge of the
person who forfeits his claim. Even if a written waiver was entered into
by the beneficiary, he would not be in a position to reject its terms.
18. Query whether many charitable corporations have not already procured
insurance against possible future tort liability.
19. In the case of Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Association, 41 Iowa 1269,
45 N.W.2d 151 (1950), plaintiff was injured while a patient in defendant hospital. When
plaintiff sued for damages, defendant raised as a defense that it was an eleemosynary
institution and therefore immune from tort liability. The Supreme Court of Iowa held
that defendant should not be permitted to avoid liability on the basis of charitable
immunity. The court said that since plaintiff was a paying patient he did not stand in




Another objection to the waiver theory is that the one forced to give
up his tort claim may not be in a financial position to make such a "contribu-
tion" to the charity. In fact, it would seem that one who directly benefits
from the charity can ill afford to waive compensation for loss of wages
or other pecuniary damage resulting from an injury. Further, even though
a plaintiff pays for the benefits received by him from the charity, he may be
denied recovery in some jurisdictions on the grounds that he is indirectly
benefited by the mere existence of the charity.
Some courts have permitted recovery against a charitable corporation
if it is engaged in profitable activities. This is based on the profit theory
whereby a charity must assume liability for such tortious conduct that arises
out of profitable ventures which are unrelated to its charitable purpose.
Here the similarity to business undertakings warrants analogous tort liability.
This theory was followed in Blatt v. George H. Nettleton Home for Aged
Women,20 where the plaintiff sustained injuries due to the defendant's
negligence concerning a building which it leased for profit. Although defend-
ant was a charitable corporation the court held that it was not entitled to
immunity since the building was a profit-making venture. The "profit
theory" as employed in Blatt may be used to extend liability to a charity which
receives payment from a plaintiff for performing its function. However, the
objection here is that it is not legally sound to deny or to allow recovery
simply on the basis of whether or not one is able to pay for the services
rendered.
Despite the fact that modified immunity is in theory an appealing
compromise, the basic considerations for or against charitable immunity
seem to weaken the advantages of adopting any modified form of immunity.
It is felt that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has given weight to the proper
issues which are decisive either in favor of retaining complete charitable
immunity or for its rejection in toto.
In Hahnemann the court urged that any rejection of charitable immunity
should be effected by the legislature and not by the courts. They felt that
abandonment of the doctrine by a retroactive court decision "would lay open
to liability all charities for their torts of the past that were not barred by the
statute of limitations at the time of the rendition of the rescinding decision."
'21
Their bases for this reasoning were that the prospective nature of a legislative
act would enable charities which have been relying upon charitable immunity
to insure against tort liability, and that the policy questions involved make it
a legislative problem. Further, it was pointed out in the concurring opinion
that the legislature has impliedly approved charitable immunity since it has
20. 365 Mo. 30, 275 S.W.2d 344 (1955).
21. 392 Pa. 75, 78, 140 A.2d 30, 32 (1958) ; Michael v. Hahnemann, supra note 1,
at 434, 172 A.2d at 771.
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studied the question but thus far has failed to act. Contrary to this position
the dissenters felt that since charitable immunity was a judicially created
doctrine, it was the responsibility of the courts to effect its abolition.
22
The most convincing argument for repudiation by the legislature is the
prospective nature of legislative acts. There is no question that hardship
would result from a repudiation of charitable immunity by the court if the
charities are not adequately insured. The dissenting opinions contend that
charitable corporations are aware that the trend is against charitable immunity
and presumably have taken adequate precautions. If this is true, then the
insurance companies are reaping the benefits of charitable immunity by
collecting premiums to protect institutions needing no such indemnity. The
insurance companies would suffer no injustice if the eventuality against which
they were insuring occurred. 23  But, if the assumptions of the dissenting
justices in the Hahnemann case are incorrect, and if it is felt that the repudia-
tion of charitable immunity is a matter for the court rather than the legislature,
the recommendation of Justice Bok's concurring opinion demands careful
consid*eration. He favors the prospective abolition of charitable immunity by
the court,2 4 but feels it should be retained for the present since many
charities are relying on the immunity. If this is true, some charitable corpora-
tions might suffer serious financial setbacks if they are not informed that the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania no longer intends to uphold their tort
immunity.
The constitutionality of prospective judicial decision has been upheld
by the United States Supreme Court.2 5 A law review article,m referred to
22. Justice Musmanno contends that since the constitution of Pennsylvania pro-
hibits the legislature from "granting to any corporation, association, or individual any
special or exclusive privileges or immunity," the courts had no power to grant such
an immunity and that the legislature should not be required to pass a law abolishing
something which is already unconstitutional. Both Justice Cohen and Justice Musmanno
feel that the court has the burden of repudiating a doctrine of its own creation:
The doctrine of charitable immunity was wrong when first enunciated and
is wrong now. We should not perpetuate the wrong by relegating to the legisla-
ture our responsibility to correct our own mistake; nor should we hide behind
our former decisions "made against common justice and the general reason of
mankind.
Michael v. Hahnemann, supra note 1, at 474, 172 A.2d at 774.
23. Michael v. Hahnemann, supra note 1, at 471, 172 A.2d at 793.
24. Id. at 442, 172 A.2d at 778.
25. In the case of Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co.,
287 U.S. 358 (1932), the Court, in upholding a state court decision that a reversal
of a previous interpretation of a rate fixing statute would operate prospectively, said:
A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice
for itself between the principal of forward operation and that of relation back-
ward. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are
law none the less for intermediate transactions.
287 U.S. 358, 364.
26. Levy, Realistic Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1960). The author also states that prospective judicial decision will become more
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by Justice Bok in his concurring opinion, strongly follows the lead of Mr.
Justice Cardozo in the Sunburst case, in advocating the adoption of pro-
spective judicial decision. A prospective decision should only be made where
prior law is being changed and where a party who relies on previous holdings
would be seriously injured if reversal operated retroactively.2 7 It is because
of this apprehension of serious injury to those relying on charitable immunity
that Justice Bok aligned himself with the majority in the Hahnemann case.
Regardless of one's personal views on Justice Bok's interesting proposal
of prospective judicial decision, his position places him in the middle of an
otherwise equally divided court. Since Justice Bok favors the abolition
of charitable immunity by the court only if it operates prospectively rather
than retroactively, Pennsylvania is faced with a dilemma wherein a majority
of the court favors repudiation but permits its continued existence because
unable to agree on the method by which it should be repudiated. It is sub-
mitted that because of this unusual alignment the court should make every
effort to find an acceptable method to accomplish this end. The greatest
injustice would be done by retaining a law which a majority of the court feels
no longer serves the best interests of the public.
LEE A. LEVINE
prevalent when appellate courts admit that they are making law rather than merely
"discovering" it as it always existed. Id. at 24. There are, however, several arguments
against the use of prospective judicial decision. Id. at 17. The first is that this would
be outright legislation by the courts. Another is that prospective decisions would
discourage appeals by those parties who fear that even were the court to reverse itself
they will not receive the benefit thereof. A third is that a prospective reversal must
of necessity be mere dictum and, therefore, the state of the law will remain uncertain.
A fourth criticism of prospective judicial decision is that appellate courts will be
encouraged to reverse previous decisions, thereby diminishing the importance of stare
decisis and reliance on prior case law.
27. Id. at 12.
IN RE NEGLIA'S ESTATE: VALIDITY OF TRANSFER BY
GIFT OF UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS IN
CO-OWNERSHIP FORM
In the recent case of In re Neglia's Estate,1 the decedent had attempted
an inter vivos gift of a United States savings bond to her husband by
endorsing the bonds, stating her intent to make a gift of the bonds, and
manually delivering them to her husband who retained possession thereof
until decedent's death. Because the transfer was not made to conform to
standard federal regulatory procedures, 2 the Orphans' Court of Cambria
County held that the decedent's brother, the person designated on the bonds
as co-owner with the decedent, was the owner. This decision was based
on the principle that federal regulations have the force and effect of law.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania this decree was reversed.
The legal issue involved in this Case Note is whether a United States savings
bond, issued pursuant to the federal regulations, 3 which prohibit their trans-
fer in any other form than that specified, can be the subject of a gift either
inter vivos or causa mortis without conforming to standard regulatory
procedures.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that federal regulations do not
control the eventual disposition of the proceeds. By reason of the contract
of purchase, upon death of one co-owner, payment must be made to the
designated co-owner. However, these regulations do not apply to the
individual rights of persons who, under the state law of property, have become
equitably entitled to the proceeds. It is submitted that these regulations
determine the rights of the holder of the bond as against the Government;
but, they do not determine the rights of individual citizens against each
other arising out of transactions concerning the bonds. It does not necessarily
follow that just because the regulations of the United States Treasury De-
partment on the transfer of the bonds were not complied with, the attempted
gift to the husband should be void.
1. 403 Pa. 464, 170 A.2d 357 (1961).
2. The pertinent regulations are as follows:
31 C.F.R. § 315.15 (1959). Limitation on transfer or pledge. Savings bonds
are not transferable and are payable only to the owners named thereon, except
as specifically provided in the regulations....
31 C.F.R. § 315.60(a) (1959). Payment-During the lives of both co-own-
ers. The bond will be paid to either upon his separate request, and upon pay-
ment to him the other shall cease to have any interest in the bond....
31 C.F.R. § 315.60(b) (1959). Reissue-During the lives of both co-owners.
The bond may be reissued upon the request of both if presented and surrendered
during the lifetime of both .... Form PD 1938 should be used to request
reissue ....
3. 31 C.F.R. § 315.0-.94 (1959).
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It appears that the purpose of the federal regulations in preventing
transfers is two-fold: (1) to encourage thrift and savings by small investors
by accumulating interest until the date of maturity (since the interest due
upon the bonds is not currently paid, but accumulates until the date of
maturity) 4 and (2) to prevent the Government from becoming involved in
suits between claimants of Government bonds.5 These considerations seem
to permeate most of the decisions in point. Because of the secure and
reliable debt which the bond evidences, it is also felt that perhaps an easily
transferable entity would be used as a substitute for currency in commercial
transactions.
With respect to rights in United States savings bonds registered in
the names of two individuals in the alternative, the majority rule is that the
surviving co-owner is vested with the sole ownership of the bonds.6 The
only exception made to this rule is where the surviving co-owner is adjudged
guilty of fraud or other inequitable conduct.7
The majority of the jurisdictions, holding that federal regulations are
controlling, appear to look to the following rules: (1) savings bonds are
not transferable and are payable only to the owners named thereon," (2) the
survivor will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner if either co-
owner dies without the bond having been presented and surrendered for
payment or authorized reissue,9 and (3) no judicial proceedings will be
recognized which would give effect to an attempted voluntary transfer inter
vivos of a bond.'0
Apart from the regulations, the majority rule utilizes other theories
to prevent a transfer of the bonds. It can certainly be argued that since
4. Moore's Adm'r v. Marshall, 302 Ky. 729, 196 S.W.2d 369 (1946).
5. Silverman v. McGinnes, 259 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1958).
6. Re Prifer, 53 Pa. D.&C. 103, 7 Mon. Leg. R. 19, 10 Schuy. Reg. 170 (1945)
Moore's Admr' v. Marshall, supra note 4; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Tezyk, 140 N.J.
Eq. 474, 55 A.2d 26 (1947) ; Thomas v. McGroarty, 69 Pa. D.&C. 108, 40 Luzerne Leg.
Reg. 335 (1948) ; Connell v. Bauer, 240 Minn. 280, 61 N.W.2d 177 (1953) ; Horstman
Estate, 398 Pa. 506, 159 A.2d 514 (1960). The basis for this weight of authority
seems to be that a gift by delivery only with appropriate words indicating an intention
to give, but without registration in the name of the donee, is not effective since it is
in violation of the regulations and provisions under which these bonds were issued. To
hold otherwise would be to ignore the regulations which are a part of the law under
which they were issued, and would hinder the accomplishment of the purposes intended
by those regulations and lead to confusion as to the disposition of the great amount
of these bonds in every state.
7. Katz, Adm'x v. Lockman, 356 Pa. 196, 51 A.2d 619 (1947). This was an action
by administratrix to have the transfer of bonds set aside on the ground that defendant,
by fraud and undue influence induced the deceased father to place bonds in joint names.
Evidence sustained a decree directing the defendant to transfer bonds to administratrix.
8. 31. C.F.R. § 315.15 (1959).
9. 31. C.F.R. § 315.61 (1959).
10. 31. C.F.R. § 315.20 (1959).
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the United States Government may elect not to respect the transaction of
an attempted gift (without transfer by registration), the intended donee will
not be enabled to collect the debt evidenced by the bond. Thus complete
dominion and control of the bond has not really been vested in the donee
as required by state rules governing gifts inter vivos. It becomes uncertain
as to who owns what with reference to the debt evidenced by the bond.11
Thus, the donor has not done everything possible to give the donee com-
plete dominion until the bonds are reissued in the name of the donee, as
required by the regulations. In the absence of such compliance, the trans-
fer would be a mere transfer of possession and custody without the requisite
relinquishment of ownership. Although this scheme of thought is theoreti-
cally sound, practically speaking, it leaves much to be desired. For, if the
intent of the donor to make a gift is correctly manifested, justice can follow
only by giving recognition to his desire. When the donor has performed
all other reasonable acts to manifest his intent to relinquish ownership, it
should make little difference that a donee has not as yet obtained complete
ownership in terms of the regulations.
The bond is actually a contract between the United States Government
and the registered owner. Consequently, the majority holds that federal law
must govern the transfer and the rights of the parties thereto. 12 These courts
seem to reject any distinction between the right to collect from the Federal
Government and the respective rights of the alleged donor-donee. This
theory is based on the ground that a donor would not intend to make a gift
which the donee could not utilize and enjoy. It is felt that all courts should
give effect to the regulations under which the bonds were issued since they
represent the policy of the federal government and are an essential part of
the contract.'3 For under the regulations the purchaser of a United States
savings bond may still donate the value of a bond to another as a gift by
having the bond issued and registered, or reissued, in the name of the prospec-
tive donee as sole owner, as co-owner,' 4 or as beneficiary.' 5 Finally, it was
the apparent pressure of state policy which brought the court in Moore's
Admr' v. Marshall'6 to conclude:
A holding that these United States savings bonds are trans-
11. Brown v. Vinson, 188 Tenn. 120, 216 S.W.2d 748 (1949).
12. Connell v. Bauer, supra note 6; Hart v. Hart, 194 Misc. 162, 81 N.Y.S.2d
764 (1948), aff'd, 274 App. Div. 1036, 85 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1949) ; Re Prifer, supra note
6; Horstman Estate, supra note 6.
13. The majority rule further bases its contentions on the fact that federal law,
as represented by the Treasury Regulations, is supreme and state law or policy in
conflict therewith must give way. In Re Evans' Estate, 57 Pa. D.&.C. 55 (1947).
14. Dempsey v. First Nat. Bank, 353 Pa. 473, 46 A.2d 160, aflrming 46 Lack. Jur.
121 (1945).
15. Re Laundree, 277 App. Div. 994, 100 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1950).
16. Moore's Admr' v. Marshall, supra note 4.
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ferable by gift inter vivos would defeat the purpose of the Act
of Congress 17 and the Treasury Regulations, and would open the
door for evasion of plainly expressed restrictions on transfer. Each
of these bonds, together with the Act and Treasury Regulations,
constitute a valid and binding contract determining the rights of
the parties therein, and the regulations have the force and effect of
lawi8 and are to be read into the contract between the purchaser of
the bonds and the United States Government.'0 (Emphasis and
footnotes added.)
However, this presents a question as to the extent a regulation may
control the basic property law concerning gifts in the several states. For
there appears to be no justifiable basis for preventing a state court from
declaring a gift valid when the requisite elements of a gift have been
performed. To reason otherwise would be to change the property laws
of a state. This is certainly not the intent of the federal regulations.
On the other hand, a few jurisdictions form the nucleus for the minority
rule. These courts take the position that the regulations have no binding
force or effect concerning the transfer of the bonds. It is felt that the contract
between the United States Government and the purchaser fixes legal title to
the bonds for the purpose of protecting the Government against suits involving
title. However, the federal regulations do not and should not affect other
legal rights of third parties or change settled rules of law not necessary to
effectuate its purpose.2 0 Such courts point out that they are not passing
upon the issue of whether or not the provision prohibiting judicial proceed-
ings21 might not become material in a controversy between the donee and
the Government or the fact that the donee might experience some difficulty
in having the bonds cashed. There is justification for this since it is in the
best interests of the public to prevent a multitude of unnecessary litigation.
However, these courts do hold that whatever the outcome of the controversy
between the donee and the Government when such a bond is presented to
the Treasury Department for payment or reissue, nevertheless, as between
the executor of the decedent's estate and the donee, the latter is entitled to
17. 49 STAT. 20 (1935), as amended; 31 U.S.C. § 757c (1959).
18. The enabling statute authorizing United States savings bonds makes no
mention of the fact that the prescribed regulations should be given the "force and
effect of law."
19. Apparently, the fact that the bonds were purchased solely with the funds of
the decedent in In Re Neglia made little difference to the lower court, for this was not
to affect the rights of the surviving co-owner to sole and absolute ownership.
20. Silverman v. McGinnes, supra note 5 (valid gift of United States savings bonds
to former wife and children without a reissuance) ; Re Borchardt's Estate, 179 Misc.
456, 38 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1942).
21. 31 C.F.R. § 315.20 (1959). Such provision prohibits giving effect to a
voluntary transfer inter vivos of such bonds.
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the bond by virtue of the gift.22 It appears that these are the better reasoned
decisions in that the regulations merely provide a convenient method of pay-
ment by which to discharge the Government's obligations. There appears
to be no authority that it was the intention of Congress to create a non-
alienable chose in action; but, rather to provide a guide by which transfers
of the bonds might be facilitated.
23
There are cases in Pennsylvania wherein the courts, without specific
reference to Treasury Regulations, or to the question whether such bonds
may be the subject of a gift, have held, upon the particular circumstances,
that there were valid gifts causa mortis. In Re Elliott's Estate,24 although
the transfer of a United States savings bond was in issue, the court con-
cerned itself solely with the problems of manifested intent and constructive
delivery. In Re Borchardt's Estate,25 a New York trial court took the
minority view in holding that the regulations did not explicitly or im-
pliedly prohibit a gift causa mortis of such bonds. In rejecting Re Borchardt's
Estate, a New Jersey court, 26 in taking the majority view, had suggested
that in order to hold a gift causa mortis of such bonds valid, such an excep-
tion to the regulations should be made by the federal government. In seem-
ing response to this, the Treasury Department subsequently issued a regula-
tion providing that a gift causa mortis of sole-ownership bonds would be
recognized.
2 7
In regard to gifts inter vivos, the minority view is that all personal
property, when legal and equitable title can pass by actual or constructive
delivery, may be the subject of a valid gift.28 Thus, a gift of a chose in
action may be made by manual delivery of the instruments even though the
subject of the gift is securities which are non-negotiable or even non-trans-
ferable by their own terms.
29
22. Re Vanicek's Estate, 145 Neb. 531, 17 N.W.2d 477 (1945) ; Blair v. Kirchner,
319 Ill. App. 348, 49 N.E.2d 292 (1943); Marshall v. Felker, 156 Fla. 476, 23 So.2d
555 (1945) (all of which involved United States postal saving certificates which were
issued under similar governmental prohibitions against transfer).
23. As in the case of many regulations, they are to be given the connotation that
they merely suggest or provide direction, rather than mandatorily decree.
24. 312 Pa. 493, 167 Atl. 289 (1933) ; see also Re Yeager's Estate, 273 Pa. 359,
117 Ati. 67 (1922).
25. Re Borchardt's Estate, supra note 20.
26. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Tezyk, supra note 6.
27. 31 C.F.R. § 315.22 (1959).
28. It was ruled in Re Rigard's Estate, 32 Erie Co. L.J. 219 (1948), at 220, that
"the conditions surrounding the transaction will be invoked to interpret the intention
of the donor and the donee, and if they are competent to give and competent to receive,
and there is delivery and a transfer of possession, if will be regarded by law as an
executed contract."
29. In Re Estate of Diskin, 105 Pa. Super. 519, 161 Atl. 893 (1932); Janusiki's
Estate, 2 Fiduciary 505, 68 Montg. 343, 16 Som. 160, 66 York 137 (1952) (Government
bonds and postal certificates).
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In Horstman Estate,3 0 one of the more recent and leading cases on the
subject in Pennsylvania, the supreme court determined that between the
Government and the co-owner designated on the bond, by reason of the
contract of purchase, payment must be made to the designated co-owner.
However, it is felt that Re Neglia must be distinguished from Horstman
Estate in four respects.
In Re Neglia there was (1) a delivery, (2) an endorsement of the
bonds, (3) a payment by the United States Government of three of the six-
teen bonds in issue, and (4) a recognition by the brother (co-owner) of a
valid gift although he subsequently refused voluntarily to make the transfer.
It is submitted that if the facts in Horstman Estate would have given rise
to a valid gift under the property laws of the state, then the supreme court
at that time might have determined that the federal regulations would not
control the eventual disposition of the proceeds of the bonds.
It is significant to note that the only cases discovered which support
the minority view concern bonds of the sole-ownership variety. None con-
cern a gift inter vivos of a bond which was held valid where the rights of
the co-owners were thereby defeated. Furthermore, it appears that the
regulation permitting a gift causa mortis3' still prohibits such a gift if the
bonds are in co-ownership form. Thus, it may well be that Re Neglia has
dealt a harsh blow to the majority rule by means of a hair line interpretation
of the regulations. Perhaps the court remained cognizant of the fact that
the bonds are taken out in co-ownership form for the purpose of taxation in
some cases and that the usual procedure when buying bonds is not to read
the fine print concerning their transfer. This would appear to be valid
justification for the better-reasoned minority view. Just as the regulations
took a more liberal view concerning a gift causa mortis of sole-ownership
United States savings bonds (which is certainly a great step forward since
the requirements for such a gift are so much more stringent than those of a
gift inter vivos) so, too, may the regulations someday permit other transfers
by gift in order to alleviate the chaos in which the courts find themselves.
SHELDON A. WEINSTEIN
30. Horstman Estate, supra note 6.
31. 31 C.F.R. § 315.22 (1959).
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BATTALIA v. STATE OF NEW YORK: ABOLITION OF
THE IMPACT RULE IN NEGLIGENTLY CAUSED
FRIGHT CASES
In a recent case, Battalia v. State of New York,' the New York Court
of Appeals repudiated the impact rule in negligently caused fright cases. The
case arose for injuries received when a nine-year-old girl was placed in a
ski chair lift by an attendant of the state, and the attendant failed to secure
and properly lock the safety belt. Upon the descent of the chair, the infant
plaintiff became frightened, hysterical, and suffered emotional disturbances
with consequential physical injuries. The New York Court of Claims 2 ruled
the complaint stated a cause of action. The appellate division reversed 3 holding
that under Mitchell v. Rochester R.R.4 there could be no recovery for
injuries, physical or mental, induced by negligence in the absence of some
immediate physical injury. The court of appeals5 reversed the appellate
division, affirmed the court of claims, overruled the Mitchell case,6 and
discarded the requirement of impact or immediate physical injury in cases
where fright is caused by negligence.
The purpose of this Case Note is threefold: to find justification for
abolition of the impact requirement; to show that the reasoning of the
Mitchell court was not erased in one fell swoop, but rather was gradually
eroded away by the New York courts over the last thirty-five years; and to
compare the present state of the law in New York with that of Pennsylvania.
Justification for the Battalia decision can best be shown by examining
the reasoning of the court in the Mitchell case. 7 In that case, plaintiff was
waiting on the corner for one of defendant's horse cars. The horse car was
being driven recklessly and stopped with plaintiff in a position between the
heads of the two horses, without contact with the horses. Plaintiff, who was
pregnant at the time, fainted and later suffered a miscarriage. There was
medical testimony showing that the miscarriage was the result of the mental
shock which plaintiff received when placed in this position of danger. Never-
theless, the court dismissed the complaint and held that a plaintiff may not
recover for injuries occasioned by fright, where there are no immediate
personal injuries. Three reasons were assigned for this holding. First, since
one cannot recover for injuries occasioned by negligently caused fright alone,
there could be no recovery for the consequences of such fright. Second, the
1. 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
2. 17 Misc. 2d 548, 184 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1959).
3. 11 App. Div. 2d 613, 200 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1960).
4. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
5. Supra note 1.
6. Supra note 4.
7. Ibid.
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consequential injury is too remote, and hence not proximately caused. Third,
to allow recovery would be against public policy. The public policy argument
is broken down into three phases: this type of injury could be easily feigned
and would promote fraud; the door would be opened to a flood of litigation;
and damages must rest on speculation.
The Battalia court passes quickly over the first two reasons saying,
"It is threshing old straw to deal with them."'8 Although this is true, it has
not been the New York courts which have destroyed these arguments.
The nearest which any New York court came to repudiating them was in
the case of Comstock v. Wilson.9 Here a woman fainted and fell to the
sidewalk, thereby fracturing her skull. This blackout occurred after a collision
between defendant's car and a car in which plaintiff was riding. The woman
died twenty minutes after the fall. The court found impact and granted
recovery, and all but the public policy arguments of the Mitchell case were
rejected. They were only referred to in the court's statement, "The con-
clusions of the Mitchell case cannot be tested by pure logic." 10
The best answer to the objection that if you cannot recover for fright
alone, then you cannot recover for the consequences of fright, was set forth
in Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni." The court reasoned in this case
that when you deal with fright alone, you are dealing with a metaphysical
entity, something entirely subjective instead of objective. Where the
damages are only speculative, you cannot measure them. But where you are
dealing with the physical consequences of fright, the damages are physical
and objective and are measurable as if they had resulted from an impact or
blow.
Mitchell's second objection is that the injury consequential to the fright
is too remote and hence not proximately caused. One answer to this objection
is that the chain of causal connection between the wrongful act and the
injury to the body is not broken whether the link is fright or impact.1 2
A second answer, given in Jones v. Brooklyn Heights R.R.,"3 is that courts
allow recovery for physical injuries where the fright is accompanied by
impact. In the latter case, plaintiff was hit on the head by a small incandescent
light bulb which fell from the roof of defendant's car in which the plaintiff
was a passenger. Plaintiff was allowed recovery for a miscarriage brought
on by the shock which was stimulated by the injury. Thus New York
courts are saying fright is too remote and not proximately caused where
8. Battalia, supra note 1, at 36, 176 N.E.2d at 730.
9. 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931).
10. Id. at -, 177 N.E. at 432.
11. 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916).
12. Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123 N.W. 625 (1909).
13. 23 App. Div. 141, 48 N.Y. Supp. 914 (1897).
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there is no impact. But they allow recovery for the fright in other cases
where there is a slight impact, and where the fright is just as remote.
This brings us to the argument that to allow recovery without impact
would be against public policy. The Battalia court feels that all three prongs
of this argument are subject to challenge. To the objection that to allow
recovery would promote fraudulent claims, the court of appeals answers
"that fraudulent accidents and injuries are just as easily feigned in slight-
impact cases, wherein New York permits recovery."'1 4 For example, a
plaintiff could just as easily feign an injury where a falling lightbulb
grazes his head, as where the light bulb just misses his head. The question
of falsity of a claim is a question for the jury.
"The doctrine of expediency or public policy is a doctrine that should
be very sparingly and cautiously employed, for if a person's rights have been
unlawfully invaded, it would ill become a court of justice to withhold its
remedy on the ground of expediency."' 5 This statement is the answer to
the objection that to allow recovery without impact would expose the courts
to a flood of litigation. The remaining branch of the public policy argument,
that damages are somewhat speculative and difficult to prove, is discussed in
Ferrara v. Galluchio"6 and in Battalia. The court states in Battalia that this
is the only substantial policy argument of Mitchell. However, the court goes
on to say, "The question of proof in individual situations should not be the
arbitrary basis upon which to bar all actions.' 7 It is the function of juries
to determine whether damages have been proven and what the compensation
should be. Damages are allowed where there is a slight impact accompanying
a nervous shock. They are just as difficult to measure where there has only
been this slight impact.
The overruling of the Mitchell case represents the termination in New
York of thirty-five years in which the "impact" doctrine had been in a state
of decay. Oddly enough, the first change which occurred in the Mitchell
rule made the immediate physical injury requirement more stringent. Hack
v. Dady18 held that bodily injury must not only accompany the shock, but
also must, at least in part, cause the shock in order to enable the plaintiff to
recover for the shock and its effects. Here a few drops of molten lead fell
upon the clothes and one hand of the plaintiff, due to the negligence of the
defendant. When the plaintiff suffered a miscarriage, recovery was allowed
for both the miscarriage and the shock, as the injury resulting from the
molten lead on the hand was at least a partial cause of the shock. The rule
14. Battalia, supra note 1, at 37, 176 N.E.2d at 731.
15. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co., supra note 11, at -, 73 So. at 207.
16. 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
17. Battalia, supra note 1, at 38, 176 N.E.2d at 731.
18. 142 App. Div. 510, 127 N.Y. Supp. 22 (1911).
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set forth in the Hack case was reiterated in Tracy v. Hotel Wellington Corp.,1 9
where plaintiff suffered both actual immediate physical injuries as well as
fright, causing further physical injury. The court held there may be a
recovery, where both bodily injury and fright concur in producing nervous
shock giving rise to injury.
The erosion of the Mitchell doctrine began in 1925, in the supreme
court casd of Sider v. Reid Ice Cream Co. 2 0 Here plaintiff became nauseous
when she found an insect in some ice cream she was eating. The supreme
court found immediate physical injury and held that where there is a physical
injury caused by the negligence of the defendant, accompanied by fright
producing illness, recovery may be had both for the physical injury and the
consequences of the fright. The court openly criticizes the Mitchell case,
saying, "There is now no need for the Mitchell rule on the score of public
policy or necessity." 21 This is a case where the court is not forced by the
facts to follow Mitchell, but still takes an opportunity to express its
dissatisfaction with it.
It is important to note that the Mitchell court does not use the word
"impact." Instead, it uses the terminology "immediate physical injury." Since
it is possible to have impact without injury, it could be said that Mitchell v.
Rochester R.R. did not establish the impact rule, but was merely a fore-
runner of it. The words "physical impact" are used for the first time in
the Comstock case. 22 It would therefore be proper to credit the Comstock case
with founding the "impact doctrine" in New York. However, no authorities
or courts seem to have ever made any distinction between the terms "impact"
and "immediate physical injury." These terms are treated synonymously and
used interchangeably.
If a jurisdiction which adheres to the impact requirement should decide
in the future to differentiate between the two terms, the scope of recovery
would be expanded to those plaintiffs who have received impact, but no
immediate physical injury. This may be illustrated by assuming a situation
where plaintiff is brushed by a speeding car, but there is no immediate
physical injury. Plaintiff is frightened and the fright aggravates a heart
condition. Plaintiff is subsequently hospitalized and suffers increased pain.
Here, under a strict construction of the Mitchell doctrine, recovery would have
to be denied, as there is no "immediate physical injury." Under the Corn-
stock decision, there could be recovery as there was "impact."
Where the defendant's negligence inflicts an immediate physical injury,
such as a wrenched back, the courts allow compensation for purely mental
19. 188 App. Div. 923, 176 N.Y. Supp. 923 (1919).
20. 125 Misc. Rep. 835, 211 N.Y. Supp. 582 (1925).
21. Id. at -, 211 N.Y. Supp. at 583.
22. Comstock, supra note 9, at -, 177 N.E. at 433.
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elements of damage accompanying it, such as fright at the time of the injury.2 3
Thus there is no need for impact where there is an accompanying physical
injury. This illustrates that the courts use the term "immediate physical
injuries" in two different contexts. First, they use it interchangeably
with the word "impact" in situations where there is no accompanying bodily
damage at the time of the fright. Second, they use ft in instances where there
is bodily damage accompanying the fright.
After Comstock,24 the stage was set for the Battalia decision in Ferrara
v. Galluchio .25 In a malpractice suit against a physician, a patient recovered
damages for a severe case of "cancerophobia" which developed as a result
of negligent therapy. It was evident from the majority opinion in the
Ferrara case that the Mitchell doctrine was no longer heeded in New York.
The court said, "Freedom from mental disturbance is now a protected interest
in this state. ''26 The court went on to remove the remaining branch of the
public policy argument in Mitchell by stating that the only valid objection
against recovery for mental injury is the danger of vexatious suits and
fictitious claims, but said "that it is entirely possible to allow recovery
only upon satisfactory evidence and deny it when there is nothing to
corroborate the claim, or to look for some guarantee of genuineness in
the circumstances of the case."27 Here the guarantee of genuineness of the
cancerophobia was found in the circumstances of the case. In allowing
recovery, the court was proceeding squarely against the rules of the Mitchell
and Comstock cases which state that there can be no recovery for emotional
disturbances arising out of negligent conduct, unless there is either "immedi-
ate physical injury" or "impact." Here there was neither. The court did
not overrule Mitchell, but simply ignored it. The express abrogation
occurred three years later when the court of appeals in Battalia stated, "It
is our opinion that Mitchell should be overruled.
'28
In Pennsylvania, the first case in this area was Ewing v. Pittsburgh C.
& St. L. Ry. Co. 29 Here two of defendant's railroad cars collided and fell
from the tracks against the dwelling house of the plaintiff. Plaintiff was
subjected to great fear, fright, and alarm. He consequently became sick and
permanently disabled. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that fright
unaccompanied by some injury to the person does not provide grounds for
recovery, even though there are later physical injuries. The reason assigned
for this holding is that the permanent injury could not have been foreseen,
23. PROSSER, TORTS 178 (2d ed. 1955).
24. See text accompanying note 9, supra.
25. Supra note 16.
26. Supra note 16, at 999.
27. Ibid.
28. Battalia, supra note 1, at 35, 176 N.E.2d at 730.
29. 147 Pa. 40, 23 At. 314 (1892).
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as it was not one which was likely to result from the collision; hence, it
was not the proximate cause of the permanent injury. This case was decided
four years before the Mitchell case. The Mitchell argument, that the con-
sequential injury is too remote and hence not proximately caused, is based
on the same reasoning as in the Ewing case.30
The court does not mention the word "impact" in Ewing, but stated
that fright must be accompanied by some injury to the person. Since it
is possible to have impact without injury, it appears that the Ewing court,
like the Mitchell court, would not allow recovery for fright when accompanied
by impact, but without an accompanying injury.
Pennsylvania did not adopt the public policy argument set forth in the
Mitchell case until Huston v. Freemansburg Boro.A' In this case, plaintiff's
husband who was recovering from an attack of typhoid fever became mentally
distressed from the noise of dynamite blasting by the defendant borough
and died shortly thereafter. The court denied recovery, assigning as their
reason: the courts would be flooded with an increase in litigation, much of
which would come as a result of feigned injuries. Chief Justice Mitchell went
on to describe mental disturbance as a cause of action as "so intangible, so
untrustworthy, so illusory, and so speculative."
'3 2
Even in Huston,33 the court makes no mention of the word "impact."
This word did not appear in Pennsylvania until Potere v. City of Philadel-
phia.3 4 Here, the mental anguish and fright of the plaintiff was accompanied
by some immediate physical injury resulting from actual impact. The court
held that where plaintiff sustains bodily injuries, no matter how trivial, and
there is a slight impact upon his person which is accompanied by fright or
mental anguish directly traceable to the peril in which the defendant placed
himself, the mental suffering is a legitimate element of damage. This case
can be distinguished from the Ewing, Mitchell, and Battalia cases in that
here the physical injury occurred simultaneously with the fright and was
not a consequence of it. But Potere is important, because it incorporates the
use of the word "impact" into the law of Pennsylvania.
This brings us to the case cited by Justice Van Voorhis in his
dissent in Battalia-Bosley v. Andrews.3 5 This is a statement of the present
law of Pennsylvania. Here plaintiff suffered a heart disability resulting from
fright and shock upon being chased by a trespassing bull which did not
touch her. The court held that there could be no recovery of damages for
30. Ibid.
31. 212 Pa. 548, 61 At. 1022 (1905).
32. Id. at 550, 61 At. at 1023.
33. Supra note 31.
34. 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100 (1955).
35. 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1959).
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injuries resulting from fright or nervous shock, or mental or emotional
disturbance, unless accompanied by physical injury.
Justice Bell in the majority opinion wrote that to allow such recovery
would open "Pandora's box."'3 6 He then attributes the following reasons to
the holding. First, for every genuine and deserving claim, there would likely
be a tremendous number of illusory or imaginative or faked ones. Second,
medical science is unable to prove that ulcers, fainting spells, and even
serious injuries, sfich as heart attacks, were not caused by the defendant's
negligent act. The first rationale is the old public policy argument of the
Mitchell case. The fallacies of this contention have been previously examined.
The second reason deals with disproof and is a variation of the proximate
cause argument in the Mitchell case. The defendant does not have the
burden of proving that the consequential injuries were not caused by the
fright, but rather, the plaintiff must prove that they were. Granted, the
plaintiff has a better chance of convincing a jury that the fright was the
proximate cause of the consequential injury if the defendant is unable to
invoke the aid of contrary medical testimony; but proximate cause is only
one element that must be proven before recovery can be granted. The
reasoning of the majority appears to be in accord with the usual reluctance of
the courts to depart from long-established precedent.
While New York is now in agreement with the Restatement view on
"impact," Pennsylvania still adheres to the old rule.3 The Restatement repu-
diates the Mitchell doctrine when in a comment it uses the facts of that case
to illustrate a situation where the defendant should be liable.3, It explicitly
imposes liability on a defendant whenever he unintentionally causes emotional
distress to another if he ought to have realized that his actions involved an
unreasonable risk of causing such distress, except by knowledge of the harm
or peril of a third person, and if he should have realized from facts within
his knowledge that such distress might result in illness or bodily harm.
39
It is also expressly provided that the fact that any injury or harm results from
the internal operation of fright or distress does not relieve the defendant of
the liability therefor.
40
36. Id. at 168, 142 A.2d at 266.
37. Supra note 35.
38. RESTATEMENT, ToRTS § 346, comment c (1948).
39. Id. § 313, states that:
If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he is subject
to liability to the other for resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor (a)
should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing
the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person,
and (b) from facts known to him should have realized that the distress, if it
were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm. (Emphasis added.)
40. Id. § 346, states that:
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing
bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or
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It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania might well con-
sider the impact rule in light of the fundamental common law rule that permits
recovery for every wrong. It should ask whether it is better to deny
meritorious claims in order to prevent the perpetration of false ones, or
whether it is better instead to permit compensation of the meritorious claims
and rely on the safeguards of the trial system to weed out the fictitious claims,
one of the purposes for the system's existence. If the court chooses the latter
alternative, it would then be administering justice and not a staid inflexible
body of rules.
JAY H. CONNER
other similar and immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm
results solely from the internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance
does not protect the actor from liability.
